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COMMENT
INTEREST RATE SWAPS UNDER THE
COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT
INTRODUCTION
Swap transactions involve an exchange of cash flows between
counterparties, "which vary in terms of the currency, interest rate ba-
sis and a number of other financial features."' Essentially, a swap
contract is a portfolio of forward contracts. 2 The vast majority of
swap transactions involve bundled cash-settled forward agreements in
which interest rates determine cash flows. Interest rate swaps provide
financial risk managers a powerful tool to either mitigate or intensify
the exposure of a portfolio to interest rate risk. This Comment ana-
lyzes the legal standing of interest rate swaps vis-h-vis the Commod-
ity Exchange Act ("Act").3
The exchange-trading requirement of the Act generally limits the
execution of contracts for future delivery of specified commodities to
markets approved by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
("Commission"). 4 Moreover, the Act prohibits deceptive dealing in
such transactions.5 Before 1974, the Act's jurisdiction was limited to
contracts for the future delivery of certain finite commodities.6 Under
1 SATYAJrT DAS, SWAP & DERIVATIVE FINANCING: THE GLOBAL REFERENCE TO
PRODUCTS, PRICING, APPLICATIONS AND MARKETS 12 (1994); see also Policy Statement Con-
cerning Swap Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,694, 30,695 (1989) ("[A] swap may be character-
ized as an agreement between two parties to exchange a series of cash flows measured by dif-
ferent interest rates, exchange rates, or prices with payments calculated by reference to a princi-
pal base (notional amount)."); Procter & Gamble v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270, 1275
(S.D. Ohio 1996) ("A swap is an agreement between two parties ('counterparties') to exchange
cash flows over a period of time.").
2 See JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, & OTHER DERIVATIVES 121 (4th ed. 2000)
(explaining how a forward contract can be understood as a "simple example of a swap");
CHARLES W. SMITHSON, MANAGING FINANCIAL RISK: A GUIDE TO DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS,
FINANCIALENGINEERING AND VALUE MAXIMIZATION 31-32 (3d ed. 1997) (same).
3 See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (2000).
4 See id. § 6(a). Congress established the Commission as an independent federal agency
charged with the administration and enforcement of the Act. See id. § 4a(a).
5 Seeid. 996b, 6o.
6 Congress limited the scope of the Grain Futures Act of 1922, the predecessor to the
Act, to "wheat, corn, oats, barley, rye, flax and sorghum." Ch. 369, § 2, 42 Stat. 998. The
Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 expanded the term commodity to include "wheat, cotton,
rice, corn, oats, barley, rye, flaxseed, grain sorghums, mill feeds, butter, eggs and Irish pota-
toes." Ch. 545, §§ 2, 3(a)-(b), 49 Stat. 1491. From 1936 to 1955, the term evolved to include:
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the pre-1974 formulation of the federal commodities law, contracts on
interest rates would not have been exposed to the Commission's ju-
risdiction. However, Congress, through the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission Act of 1974 ("1974 Act"), broadened the statu-
tory definition of commodity to include virtually all finite goods and
articles and any non-finite service, right, or interest that might poten-
tially form the subject matter of a contract for future delivery.7
The consequences of violating the Act make the operation of
over-the-counter ("OTC") markets in violative transactions practi-
cally impossible. OTC transactions subject to the exchange-trading
requirement are illegal and, thus, unenforceable in contract. Moreo-
ver, the Act empowers the Commission to petition federal courts to
enjoin any person from executing transactions that violate the ex-
change-trading requirement, to enforce compliance with the ex-
change-trading requirement, and to take any remedial action neces-
sary "to remove the danger of violation" of the exchange-trading re-
quirement. 9 Upon request of the Commission, a federal court may
order participants in illegal OTC transactions to disgorge cash flows
obtained through the transaction. 0 Finally, the Act exposes partici-
pants in illegal transactions to criminal sanctions," civil penalties,
12
and actual damages in private actions.'
3
Wool tops, see Act of Apr. 7, 1938, ch. 108, 52 Stat. 205; all fats and oils, see Act of Oct. 9,
1940, ch. 786, § 1, 54 Stat. 1059; onions, see Act of Aug. 28, 1954, ch. 1041, § 710(a), 68 Stat.
913; and wool, see Act of July 26, 1955, ch. 382, § 1, 69 Stat. 375. Congress then prohibited
trading in onion futures in 1958. See Act of Aug. 28, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-839, § 1, 72 Stat.
1013. In 1968, soybean meal, livestock, livestock products and frozen concentrated orange
juice were added as commodities. See Act of Feb. 19, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-258, § 1, 82 Stat.
26; Act of July 23, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-418, 82 Stat. 413.
7 See 7 U.S.C. § la(3) ("The term 'commodity' means ... goods and articles, except
onions ... and all services, rights, and, interests in which contracts for future delivery are pres-
ently or in the future dealt in.").
8 See id. § 6(a). The general rule is courts would leave parties to an illegal contract
where it finds them. There are two exceptions. First, courts typically order restitution when a
party is unjustly enriched by receiving a benefit from a less blameworthy party and the less
blameworthy party is not guilty of "serious moral turpitude." JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M.
PERILLO, THE LAw OF CONTRACTS § 22.7 (4th ed. 1998). Second, a party not guilty of "serious
moral turpitude" may obtain restitution before "any part of the illegal performance is consum-
mated" when doing so would "prevent the attainment of the illegal purpose for which the bar-
gain was made." Id. § 22.8. Most OTC derivative transactions would not qualify for either
exception. Since swap participants are generally sophisticated, a court would not likely find one
party substantially less blameworthy than the other. Moreover, performance of an OTC deriva-
tive arrangement subject to the Act would consummate an illegal performance. Therefore,
neither exception to the general rule would apply.
9 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1.
10 See, e.g., CFTC v. Co Petro Mktg. Group, Inc., 680 F.2d 573, 583 (9th Cir. 1982) (af-
firming a district court order of disgorgement pursuant to finding of an illegal off-exchange
transaction).
I See § 13(c) (providing that illegal off-exchange transactions constitute misdemeanors
punishable by a fine of up to $100,000 and/or imprisonment up to one year).
12 See id. § 13a-l(d)(1) (exposing violators to civil penalties of not more than $100,000 or
triple the money for each violation). See also Global Link Miami Corp., [1998-1999 Transfer
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The Act has been the source of much consternation among OTC
interest rate swap market participants. In 1987, the Commission an-
nounced that the Act's jurisdiction extended to interest rate swaps.14
The Commission's assertion implied that OTC interest rate swap
transactions violated the exchange-trading requirement. While the
Commission took no regulatory action, market participants feared that
the implicit assertion meant that OTC swap contracts were illegal and
thus, unenforceable. The Commission, responding to harsh criticism,
disavowed its assertion in 1989.15
Yet the consternation persisted. The Commission attempted to
mitigate the legal risk that motivated fears by crafting a safe harbor
for swap transactions consistent with the structure of the Act, but to
no avail.16 The safe harbor was incongruent with case law and previ-
ous Commission opinions. Moreover, the Commission lacked ex-
plicit authority to grant safe harbor. Congress amended the Act
through enactment of the Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992 to
give the Commission explicit exemptive authority in certain condi-
tions. 17 Pursuant to this authority, the Commission in 1993 adopted
the Part 35 safe harbor exemption for swap transactions.1 8
While the swap market grew precipitously after codification of
the safe harbor policy, fears attributable to potential exposure under
the Act persisted. Three factors explained these fears. First, ques-
tions arose as to whether Part 35 exempted swap transactions memo-
rialized in standardized documentation. Second, Part 35 did not ex-
empt interest rate swaps from the anti-fraud provisions of the Act,
thus leaving in place a predicate for aggressive Commission policing
of the OTC swap market. Finally, the Commission's ill-fated 1998
concept release suggested an aggressive assertion of authority over
the OTC derivative markets.19
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 27,699 (CFTC June 21, 1999) (fining each of three prin-
cipals and their firm $100,000 for operating of an illegal board of trade and permanently ban-
ning the principles from trading on any derivatives exchange); R & W Tech. Servs., Ltd. v.
CFTC, 205 F.3d 165, 177-178 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 54 (2000) (reversing an
order that had imposed a civil penalty of $2.375 million because the Commission had abused its
discretion in using gross revenue, rather than net profit, in determining the sanction where pur-
pose of the sanction was deterrence rather than restitution).
"3 See 7 U.S.C. § 25.
14 See Regulation of Hybrid and Related Instruments, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,022 (1987) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 34).
15 See Policy Statement Concerning Swap Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,694, 30,694
(1989) ("This statement reflects the Commission's view that at this time most swap transactions
... are not appropriately regulated as [futures contracts] under the Act and regulations.").
16 See id.
17 See 7 U.S.C. § 6(c).
's See Commodities and Securities Exchange, 17 C.F.R. § 35 (2000), repealed by Com-
modity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).
19 See Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 63 Fed. Reg. 26,114, 26,115 (1998) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 34 and 35) ("The Commission has been engaged in a comprehensive regulatory
reform effort designed to update the agency's oversight of both exchange and off-exchange
20011
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In December 2000, Congress enacted the Commodity Futures
Modernization Act of 2000 ("Modernization Act"), 20 which provides
a statutory exemption for most OTC derivative transactions from the
exchange-trading requirement and the anti-deception provisions of the
Act. The sweeping nature of the exemption should allay much of the
fear among interest rate swap participants attributable to the federal
commodities law. However, the Modernization Act does not provide
an absolute shield from legal risk. Only transactions involving parties
meeting a statutorily defined suitability requirement are exempted.21
Moreover, Congress explicitly left OTC derivative transactions ex-
posed to state causes of action.
22
The Commission's sporadic, ad hoc interventions (proposed and
actual) into OTC derivative markets drove the practical concerns that
motivated the enactment of the Modernization Act. This Comment
looks into whether such congressional action was necessary for rea-
sons beyond practicality. That is, the Comment analyzes whether the
Act's jurisdiction before enactment of the Modernization Act ex-
tended to OTC interest rate swaps. Such analysis could be of real
concern for potential interest rate swap participants who do not fall
under the Modernization Act's exemptions. Moreover, the Comment
discusses the scope of the Modernization Act as it applies to interest
rate swaps.
The analysis of whether interest rate swaps generally fell within
the Act's jurisdiction prior to enactment of the Modernization Act, or
whether interest rate swaps not qualifying for statutory exemption fall
within the Act's jurisdiction, focuses on the interpretation of "contract
• . . for future delivery"--the main jurisdictional boundary of the
Act-as modified by the deferred-delivery exception. 3 Case law and
the Commission's administrative opinions contain two methods for
interpreting the term.
The first method, pervasive in cases involving finite, tangible
commodities, endeavors to hold all contracts executed for speculative
reasons within the Act's jurisdiction. There are two approaches to
this method. The first uses anticipated delivery as a proxy for
whether the counter-parties executed the deal for non-speculative
purposes. While this approach promotes analytical efficiency by re-
lieving courts of the need to inquire into complex risk-management
issues, the approach is over-inclusive in that it brought within the
markets. As part of this process, the Commission believes that it is appropriate to reexamine its
regulatory approach to the OTC derivatives market.... ) (citation omitted).
20 Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763
(2000).
21 See id. § 101.
22 See id. § 117.
23 7 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2000).
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Act's jurisdiction, before enactment of the Modernization Act, all
risk-shifting transactions, including hedging and arbitrage activity.
An alternative to the delivery proxy approach, advanced by Judge
Sotomayer, requires courts to determine directly whether the counter-
parties acted pursuant to speculative purposes.
The second method, advocated by Judge Easterbrook, rejects the
anti-speculation bias at the heart of the first method. That method,
wrote Judge Easterbrook, assumes "future" has a "lay rather than a
technical meaning."5 Alternatively, he argues that "the language has
a technical reference-that the statute specifies the kind of contracts
that trade in futures markets."26 Under this method, only transactions
having institutional characteristics substantially similar to exchange-
traded futures fall under the contract for future delivery term.
The question analyzed in this Comment is still relevant to poten-
tial swap market participants who would be suitable market partici-
pants under market standards but not under the statutory suitability
requirement, as modified by the Commission. However, the Mod-
ernization Act suggests certain presumptions that make it unlikely
that courts will find interest rate swap deals not meeting the exemp-
tive requirements to be beyond the Act's jurisdiction, even though a
good argument for such a result, based on Judge Easterbrook's obser-
vation, can be made.
I. THE INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF FORWARD AND
FUTURES TRANSACTIONS AND AN INSTITUTIONAL COMPARISON OF
OTC INTEREST RATE SWAPS AND FUTURES TRANSACTIONS
A. The Forward Transaction: The Basic Building Block of a Swap
1. Definition and Illustration
The basic building block of a swap is the forward transaction. 27
Through a forward transaction, the buyer "agrees to pay a specified
amount at a specified date in the future" in exchange for "a specified
amount of [currency, commodity, or coupon payment] from the
counterparty. ''28 At expiration, forward contracts either require actual
delivery of the underlying commodity or provide for cash settlement.
24 See MG Ref. & Mktg. v. Knight Enter., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 175, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(considering whether the parties were "willing to seize on the opportunity to speculate").
2 Nagel v. ADM Investor Servs., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 740, 751 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (Easter-
brook, Cir. J., sitting by designation), amended by 1999 WL 966437 (N.D. Ill. 1999), aff'd, 217
F.3d 436 (7th Cir. 2000).
26 Id. (emphasis added).
27 See ROBERT M. MCLAUGHLIN, OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS 70
(1999).
28 SMITHSON, supra note 2, at 54.
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To illustrate, suppose that Dillonator, a United States-based manu-
facturer, wishes to purchase from Scott Industries, Dillonator's for-
eign supplier, a supply of widgets in six months time. Scott quotes
Dillonator a six months forward price in British pounds that, at the
current exchange rate, would give Dillonator a reasonable possibility
of turning an economic profit for the next production cycle.
At this point, Dillonator faces two kinds of financial risk: price
risk and exchange rate risk. To mitigate price risk, Dillonator enters
into a forward agreement with Scott for the delivery of widgets in six
months time in exchange for the six-month delivery of the agreed
upon forward price in British pounds. The forward contract effec-
tively hedges Dillonator's natural short position (where operations
require inputs that are not owned) in widgets with a long position
(contractually promising to purchase specific goods in the future).
However, this forward deal does not mitigate Dillonator's exposure to
currency risk. To insulate itself from such risk, Dillonator enters into
a foreign-exchange forward contract with Warrick Bank. Through
that deal, Warrick Bank agrees to exchange with Dillonator an appro-
priate amount of pounds sterling for U.S. dollars with reference to the
six-month forward exchange rate.
The potential subject matter of forward contracts is not limited to
physical commodities. Theoretically, a forward contract can be based
on any process that can be modeled as a random variable. Consider
forward contracts on interest rates. Most entities, financial or other-
wise, face exposure to interest rate volatility. Cash-settled forwards
on interest rates, known as forward rate agreements, help manage the
effects of such exposure. Such an agreement involves a contractually
prescribed cash flow at some future date determined with reference to
the difference between the relevant forward interest rate, known at
formation, and the relevant future spot rate, known at maturity.29 To
illustrate, suppose that Dillonator must borrow $3 million in six
months for a term of three months and is concerned that the three-
month rate might rise in the next six months. To alleviate its concern,
Dillonator enters into a 6x9 forward rate agreement with a $3 million
notional. Thus, Dillonator locks in its interest rate costs for the bor-
rowed money. 30 These agreements are intimately connected with in-
29 See HULL, supra note 2, at 95-97. Net cash payment of a forward rate agreement
("FRA") at to (settlement date) or ti. Let FRAoftt 2] represent the annualized fixed rate deter-
mined at date 0 for the period [tt 2]. Let At = t, - to be the time period in years. Let l[tot 1]
represent the reference rate, usually the relevant LIBOR (the London inter-bank offering rate),
also in annualized form, that prevails at the settlement date, ti. The net cash payment to the
buyer of an FRA at t, is, Q(to), given by Q(to) = N(Q[to,tl] - FRAo[to,t1])At, where N notional
principle. Most FRAs call for payment at settlement date to. Under such conditions, the net
payment to buyer would be C(to), given by c(to) = Q(to)/[1 + I[to,t 1]At. That is, the payment at to
is the present value at to of the payment that would otherwise be received at t1.
' Dillonator's interest exposure from the forward loan is $3,000,000(1 + (1[6,9](1/4)))
payable in nine months. The three-month spot rate in 6-months, 1[6,9], is unknown. Hence, the
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terest rate swaps-a vanilla interest rate swap is nothing more than a
portfolio of forward rate agreements.
While the forward transaction is an important risk-management
tool, such transactions are not appropriate for everyone. Beyond fi-
nancial risks, forward deals expose participants to considerable credit
risk. Credit risk, or performance risk, is the risk that a counterparty
will not perform as promised. Credit risk is such a fundamental as-
pect of forward deals that most forward contract provisions deal with
credit issues, especially default.31 The credit intensive nature of for-
ward transaction deals makes them more appropriate for large corpo-
rations, large institutions, and governments than for smaller players.32
2. Distinguishing Forward Transactions from Futures Transactions
Judge Easterbrook argues that the main jurisdictional element of
the Act extends only to futures transactions, as distinguished from
forward transactions.3 3 Like forwards, futures obligate "one counter-
party to buy, and the other to sell, a specific underlying [asset, rate,
index, or commodity] at a specific price, amount, and date in the fu-
ture." 34 However, there are significant institutional differences be-
tween forwards and futures. First, futures are rigidly standardized-
that is, exchanges typically standardize all terms of futures contracts
except for price. They determine the underlying asset, quantity to
be delivered, daily limits on price movements, contract months, de-
livery dates, quality terms, delivery location, and tick size (minimum
allowable price change). Futures transactions involve no bilateral
negotiation other than for the price term.36 On the other hand, for-
ward transactions are bilaterally negotiated.
Second, futures positions, generally, "mark-to-market" daily.
37
The marking-to-market process mitigates credit risk, thus making fu-
tures transactions less credit intensive than forward transactions.38
loan presents Dillonator with interest rate risk. To mitigate the risk, Dillonator buys a 6x9 FRA.
In six months, the pay out to Dillonator under the FRA is $3,000,000([6,9] - FRA0[6,9])(1/4)
/( + ([to,til](l/4)). The value of the FRA cash flow in nine months is $3,000,000([6,9] -
FRAo[6,9])(1/4). Thus, Dillonator's net exposure in nine months will be $3,000,000([6,9] -
FRAo[6,9])(1/4) - $3,000,000(1 + (1[6,91(1/4))) = -$3,000,000(1 + FRAo[6,9]). Accordingly, the
purchase of a FRA transformed Dillonator's variable-interest rate exposure into a fixed-rate
exposure.
31 See SMITHSON, supra note 2, at 60.
32 See id.
33 See Nagel v. ADM Investor Servs., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 740, 751 (N.D. Ill. 1999)
(Easterbrook, Cir. J., sitting by designation), amended by 1999 WL 966437 (N.D. 111. 1999),
afid, 217 F.3d 436 (7th Cir. 2000).
3 MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 27, at 66 (alteration in original).
35 See id. at 72 ("[T]he quantity and quality of the underlying [commodity] is specified by
the exchange, as are the time, place, and method of payment or settlement.").
36 See HULL, supra note 2, at 20-23.
37 See MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 27, at 72.
38 See, id_
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Essentially, this process involves a daily settling and rewriting of the
futures position. Upon undertaking futures positions, traders post
initial margins. When the exchanges settle and re-write futures posi-
tions at the daily closing futures price, they adjust the traders' margin
accounts to reflect the daily change in the futures price. For instance,
suppose that Willie and Foley establish short and long positions, re-
spectively, in a particular wheat future at a futures price of $100.
Upon executing the futures deals, the exchange requires Willie and
Foley to post margins of $10. The next day, the futures price closes
at $103. When the exchange marks the positions to market, it closes
out both and re-establishes them at the new futures price. Upon
closing out the positions, the exchange adds three dollars to Willie's
account and deducts three dollars from Foley's account. If the
trader's margin account falls below the maintenance margin, the ex-
change requires the offending account to be replenished to the initial
margin. If the trader refuses, the exchange liquidates the trader's po-
sition. At maturity, if the trader has not previously closed his position
through an offsetting transaction, the trader takes (or makes) delivery
of the underlying commodity at the spot price.39
Returns under futures deals are path-dependent-total profit on a
futures position depends on the sequence of price movements over the
holding period. 0 For instance, suppose that the futures price upon
entering a long futures position is $100 and the spot price at maturity
is $110. If the futures price gradually increases to $120 and then de-
creases to $110, the holder of a long futures position is better off than
if the futures price gradually decreases to $90 and then steadily in-
creases to $110. This is because the early increase generates profits
that earn interest over a relatively longer period, while the latter de-
crease requires financing over a shorter period. Contrast this with a
forward transaction, where the forward price path does not affect re-
turns. Returns under forward arrangements depend only on the dif-
ference between the forward price at contract formation and the spot
price at maturity.
Finally, futures market participants do not execute transactions
between themselves. Rather, all futures market participants deal with
the clearinghouse. The purpose of the clearinghouse is to further re-
39 At maturity, the forward price of a commodity must converge to its spot price. Other-
wise, a risk free arbitrage opportunity would exist. Let Fr be the forward price at maturity and
STbe the spot price at maturity. Suppose that the forward price at maturity were greater than the
spot price. Then a trader could theoretically sell the commodity forward at Fr, immediately
purchase the commodity on the spot market at ST, and cover his obligation under the forward.
Under this strategy, the trader would receive Fr and pay ST. Since Fr > ST and the strategy
involves no risk, such a circumstance would yield a pure arbitrage profit. Minor discrepancies
might exist, however, due to market imperfections such as transaction costs.
40 See BRUCE TUCKMAN, FIXED INCOME SECURrTIEs 173 (1995) ("The final value of the
position... depends on the evolution of interest rates over the life of the contract.").
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duce credit risk.4 1 Instead of facing counterparty credit risk, futures
traders face the credit risk presented by the clearinghouse, which is
considerably less.42 Fundamentally, the clearinghouse pools credit
risks inherent in the futures market operations, spreading the costs of
such risk among market participants, and manages credit risks pre-
sented by individual traders. Moreover, the clearinghouse facilitates
closing transactions. The holder of a futures position need not find a
counterparty and negotiate an offsetting transaction to close his posi-
tion before maturity because the clearinghouse guarantees a willing
and able party to offsetting transactions. Contrast this with forward
transactions, where participants must bear counterparty credit risk and
can only offset their positions through separately negotiated transac-
tions.
B. Interest Rate Swap Transactions
1. Structure and Use
A vanilla interest rate swap, the simplest form, involves "[a]n
exchange of a fixed rate of interest on a certain notional principle for
a floating rate of interest on the same notional principal" at periodic
intervals over a predetermined quantum of time."4 Generally, interest
rate swap participants use such transactions to transform floating-rate
liabilities or assets into fixed-rate liabilities or assets, or visa versa.45
Though these swaps give risk managers a powerful tool to either
mitigate or intensify an organization's exposure to interest rate risk,
intermediaries have developed increasingly complex interest rate
swap structures to meet the unique needs of market participants. The
complexity of such instruments is limited only by market demand and
the ability to price.
To illustrate the utility of interest rate swaps in mitigating inter-
est rate risk, consider the following hypothetical involving the use of
plain vanilla interest rate swaps. Takeo Community Bank, a small
community-based lending institution, holds a portfolio of long-term
(fifteen- and thirty-year) fixed-rate mortgages and funds its lending
41 See MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 27, at 72.
42 While considerably less, some credit risk persists. See, e.g., Moody's Sees Dangers in
Futures Clearinghouse, THOMPSON'S INT'L BANKING REG., July 10, 1995, at 4 (reporting con-
cem that some clearinghouses might not be able to survive the collapse of large institutional
futures market participants); cf. Carol Jouzaitis & Lourie Cohen, $8 Million Loss for Options
Guarantor, CHI. TRiB., Dec. 5, 1987, at C4 (reporting that the failure of a large options market
participant forced a U.S. stock options clearinghouse to avert disaster by "dip[ping] into a fund
that was created to cover the obligations of failed firms").
43 See ROBERT T. DAIGLER, MANAGING RISK WITH FINANCIAL FUTURES: HEDGING,
PRICING, AND ARBrrRAGE 52 (1993).
4 HULL, supra note 2, at 665.
45 See id. at 124-25 (illustrating the mechanics of such financial transformations).
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operations with deposits. To attract depositors, Takeo must adjust its
deposit rates every three months. The maturity mismatch between
Takeo's loan portfolio and deposit obligations leaves it dangerously
exposed to interest rate volatility. For illustration, suppose Takeo's
mortgage portfolio returns a fixed seven-percent annual. As long as
short-term interest rates remain below seven percent, Takeo's interest
rate cash flow would be positive. However, when short-term interest
rates rise above seven percent, Takeo loses money. The financial risk
threatens Takeo's solvency. Interest rate swaps provide Takeo a
powerful tool to manage the problem.
Recognizing the peril presented by its exposure to interest rate
risk, Takeo agrees to a par rate swap arrangement with Simmons
Bank so that no up-front cash flow is required. The terms of the deal
require Takeo to pay Simmons a fixed rate on a notional every quarter
in exchange for a variable rate on the notional. The notional principle
is not exchanged, but only serves as a reference for determining cash
flows and is set at an amount appropriate for Takeo's hedging
needs. 46 As Figure 1 shows, the interest rate swap effectively miti-
gates Takeo's interest rate exposure in that the variable-rate exposure
to depositors is offset by the variable-rate receipts from Simmons.
Figure 1
Takeo's Interest Rate Exposure After the Swap Deal
[Customers 7,0 nnul 0 Takeo 6 0oama)p Sirnmons~akBn
Market participants also use interest rate swaps to intensify ex-
posure to interest rates, especially when organizations believe their
institutional capabilities render their views on interest rates more in-
telligent than mere speculative opinion. While corporate boards who
pay attention to such things tend to be suspicious of such activity, the
allure of reducing all-in funding costs of debt sometimes overcomes
suspicion.
" Since no principle is exchanged, par interest swaps entail very little credit risk. See
TuCKMAN, supra note 40, at 191 ("[TIhe nature of swap cash flows and the provisions of swap
agreements greatly reduce the importance of credit risk."). According to studies conducted by
the International Swap and Derivatives Association, Inc., actual economic risk presented in an
interest rate swap transaction "amounts to a small fraction of the notional principal, typically
from around 2% on gross to 1% on net." International Swaps and Derivatives Ass'n, Inc., ISDA
1997 Year-End Market Survey (visited Mar. 3, 2001) <http://www.isda.org/statistics/recent.
html#1997>. Nevertheless, credit risk is an issue. In practice, only institutions with investment-
grade debt participate in the OTC swap markets. Moreover, marginal players are sometimes
required to support their swap obligations with collateral.
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Consider the case of the infamous 5/30-interest rate swap be-
tween Procter & Gamble ("P&G") and Bankers Trust ("BT") as il-
lustrated in Figure 2f In November 1993, P&G and BT entered a
five-year, semiannual swap with a notional principle value of $200
million. BT agreed to pay P&G a fixed rate of 5.3%. P&G initially
agreed to pay a floating rate based on the thirty-day commercial paper
daily average rates, less seventy-five basis points, plus a spread. ° By
accepting the terms offered by BT, P&G essentially gave BT an inter-
est rate option contingent on the five-year and the thirty-year treasury
rates in return for a constant rate discount off the floating rate at each
settlement date. P&G and BT subsequently amended the contract in
January 1994, giving P&G an eighty-seven basis point premium each
settlement date.
Figure 2
Schematic of Cash Flows at Each Semiannual Settlement
Date49
Contingent fixed obliga-
floating rate tion determined at first
obligation option premium (fixed) semiannual settlement
date. The "option" pay
out formula.
B30-day CPDaly Avg. - 75 bp + Spread 's") ]" &
BT 5.30%P&
"CP" is the commercial paper rate.
Potentially, the deal could have reduced P&G's all-in interest
rate costs on $200 million in debt to below the risk-free rate if interest
rates had fallen, remained stable, or increased slightly. Figure 3 il-
lustrates that under such conditions, the embedded option would have
expired out of the money50 and P&G would have paid BT the daily
average of the thirty-day commercial paper rate less eighty-seven ba-
47 See Donald J. Smith, Aggressive Corporate Finance: A Close Look at the Procter &
Gamble-Bankers Trust Leveraged Swap, J. DERIVATIVES, Summer 1997, at 67, 70 (describing
the anatomy of the 5/30 swap).
48 Spread = Max [0, s], where s = [98.5(5yr CMTr% / 5.78%) - (30 year TSY price)] / 100.
"CMT" represents the yield on a five year constant maturity note. The "TSY" price represents
the 30-year Treasury bond (not including accrued interest).
49 See Smith, supra note 47, at 70.
5 I.e., Max[0,s] = 0.
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sis points. At the time, the spread between the thirty-day treasury rate
and the thirty-day commercial paper rate averaged about twenty-five
basis points. Thus, P&G would have enjoyed a below-Treasury cost
on the $200 million notional amount as long as the spread between
the thirty-day commercial paper rate and the concomitant treasury
rate stayed below eighty-seven basis points.
Figure 3
Schematic of Cash Flows at Each Semiannual Settlement
Date, Assuming the Embedded Option Expired Out of the
Money (i.e., the spread is set at zero).
/. Option expires out of
At, the money max[O,s] = 0.
30-day CP Daily Avg. - 87 b
BTP&G
5.30%
Unfortunately for P&G, interest rates did not move as its treas-
ury managers had anticipated. The swap payoff formula was ex-
tremely sensitive to rising interest rates once interest rates rose high
enough for the spread to have positive value. Once in the money, a
one basis point parallel increase in the five- and thirty-year rates re-
duced (from P&G's perspective) the value of the embedded option,
and thus the swap, an estimated $5.7 million. P&G lost much be-
cause, by the time P&G had fully unwound its position in late March
1994, interest rates had risen precipitously. On paper, P&G liability
to BT was well over $100 million, but things could have been worse.
Had P&G waited until the first settlement date in May 1994 to un-
wind its position, P&G would have been over $450 million in debt.
P&G successfully avoided much of its debt to BT through litigation. 1
Nevertheless, P&G fired its treasurer and demoted several managers
who had worked with BT to arrange the deal. Moreover, CEO Edwin
Artzt reduced his annual bonus by $100,000, reducing his pay to $2.3
million for 1994.
51 See infra Part JI.B.
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2. Distinguishing Interest Rate Swaps from Futures Transactions
Institutionally
a. Standardization: OTC Swap Market Standardization Is of a Dif-
ferent Nature than Futures Market Standardization
Vanilla swap contracts involve highly standardized documents
generally modeled after relevant International Swap and Derivatives
Association, Inc. ("ISDA") master agreements.52 Commentators sus-
picious of financial speculation have noted the increasing ease with
which market participants engage in offsetting transactions-facili-
tated by such standardization-and rendering such swaps substan-
tially similar to futures transactions for purposes of interpreting the
deferred-delivery exception of the Act.53 However, these commenta-
tors disregard a critical difference between OTC swaps and exchange-
traded futures.
On one hand, OTC swap market participants freely negotiate
variations from the standardized terms contained in ISDA master
agreements without the prior approval, or oversight, of regulators.
While vanilla swap contracts tend to have common terms, the parties
may negotiate changes through bilateral negotiation.54 This charac-
teristic of the interest rate swap market has facilitated innovations in
interest rate swap structure in recent history. On the other hand, fu-
tures exchanges do not allow negotiation of terms except for price.
Until recently, proposals for new futures contracts had to be pre-
approved by the Commission under a public interest test.55 This
regulatory model worked to stymie financial innovation.56  Recog-
52 See International Swap and Derivative Association, Inc., Publications (visited Mar. 3,
2001) <http://wwwisda.orglpublicationsindex.html> (providing a link to PDF files of different
master agreements).
53 See, e.g., Mark D. Young & William L. Stein, Swap Transactions Under the Commod-
ity Exchange Act: Is Congressional Action Needed?, 76 GEo. L.J. 1917, 1932-33 (1988) (noting
that "standardization [among other things] ... point[s] to the critical factor of offset," which
should be a decisive factor in determining whether a forward-type transaction is a contract for
future or deferred delivery); Bill Seal, OTC Derivative Markets, MANAGED AccT. REP., June
1998, at 10 (noting sentiment that "increasingly standardized" vanilla swap contracts might be
difficult to distinguish from exchange-traded futures contracts).
54 See Barry Taylor-Brill, Negotiating and Opining on ISDA Masters, in SWAPS & OTHER
DERIVATIVES IN 1999, 81, 95 (Kenneth M. Raisler & Alison M. Gregory eds., 1999) ("The
challenge for [lawyers who draft swap agreements] is finding a balance between changing the
Master or Schedule to suit one's personal desires and forcing all transactions into a standardized
mold.").
55 See 7 U.S.C. § 7(7) (2000) (requiring futures exchanges to demonstrate that "contract
market" designation by the Commission "will not be contrary to the public interest"); see also
Economic and Public Interest Requirements for Contract Market Designation, 57 Fed. Reg.
3518, 3519 (1992).
5 See After CFTC Setback, Chicago Exchanges Appeal to Congress for Regulatory Re-
lief, SEC. WK., May 24, 1999, at 8 (reporting on futures exchanges' effort to persuade Congress
to amend the Act to allow bilaterally negotiated contacts not approved by the Commission to
trade on futures exchanges.); Michael Debaie, U.S. Futures Exchanges Seek More Autonomy
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nizing this, the Commission revised its regulations to allow futures
exchanges to list new contracts "pursuant to exchange certification"
without prior approval,57 and Congress provided numerous exceptions
under the Act for the development of futures markets on certain fi-
nancial commodities.58 While the regulatory and statutory changes
are expected to facilitate innovation, time will tell how the futures
exchanges will evolve.
b. Convexity Bias in the Pricing of OTC Interest Rate Swaps Sug-
gests that the Marking-to-Market Characteristic Is a Significant In-
stitutional Difference Between OTC Interest Rate Swaps and Futures
Transactions
The presence of a persistent bias in swap rates relative to theo-
retical rates implicit in futures prices suggests that the marking-to-
market feature of the futures arrangement is an economically signifi-
cant institutional difference between interest rate swaps and futures.
Financial economists have long recognized the marking-to-market
feature of futures transactions explains the differential between for-
ward and futures prices, denoted as convexity bias. 59 Recently, Gupta
from CFTC, SEC. INDUSTRY NEWS, July 12, 1999, at I (reporting that U.S. futures exchanges
"said they should be allowed to list new contracts for trading without Commission preapproval"
in order to remain competitive with foreign futures exchanges); TMA's End-Users of Deriva-
tives Council Reinforces Importance of Derivatives: Calls for Modernization of Commodity
Exchange Act, Pr Newswire, June 8, 1999, available in WESTLAW, Westnews Library, PR
Newswire (Dialog) file (announcing Treasury Management Association's call on Congress to,
among other things, "reduce or eliminate obstacles to the development of new products" in the
futures markets). Cf. Jerry W. Markham, "Confederate Bonds, " "General Custer," and the
Regulation of Derivative Financial Instruments, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 41 (1994) (recog-
nizing a need to regulate OTC derivative markets but maintaining that an exchange-trading
requirement for OTC derivatives would "stifle an innovative and economically valuable mar-
ket").
57 See A New Regulatory Framework for Multilateral Transaction Execution Facilities,
Intermediaries and Clearing Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 77,962 (2000); Revised Procedures for
Listing New Contracts, 64 Fed. Reg. 66,373, 66,375 (1999) ("Under the final rule, contracts
may be listed for trading indefinitely in reliance on the exchange's certification: ... the Com-
mission generally will not review and approve the contract's terms ....").
59 See Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 114, 114
Stat. 2763 (2000). To qualify, exempt exchanges must limit trading to contracts on commodi-
ties with "a nearly inexhaustible deliverable supply," i.e., a supply large enough to make market
manipulation unlikely. Id. Moreover, only eligible contract participants (that is, suitable par-
ties) may trade on such exchanges. Finally, contracts on securities or securities related indexes
may not be traded on exempt exchanges. Significantly, however, contracts traded on exempt
contract markets are subject to the anti-deception provisions of the Act. See id. Such exposure
provides a basis for significant regulatory oversight.
59 See Anurag Gupta & Marti G. Subrahmanyam, An Empirical Examination of the Con-
vexity Bias in the Pricing of Interest Rate Swaps, 55 J. FIN. ECON. 239, 240-41 (2000) (survey-
ing pertinent literature suggesting the existence of statistically significant convexity bias be-
tween forward and futures contracts); but cf ASWATH SWATH DAMODARAN, INVESTMENT
VALUATION: TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES FOR DETERMINING THE VALUE OF ANY ASSET 459
(1996) ("In most real-world scenarios, and in empirical studies, the difference between futures
and forward prices is fairly small and can be ignored."); HULL, supra note 2, at 61-62 (summa-
rizing empirical research indicating mixed results).
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and Subrahmanyam found that the marking-to-market feature ex-
plains an analogous differential between market-swap rates and theo-
retical swap rates derived from Eurodollar futures prices.60 If highly
standardized vanilla swap transactions were economically equivalent
to futures transactions, one could infer accurate swap rates from fu-
tures prices. The evidence of persistent convexity bias between mar-
ket swap rates and swap rates inferred from futures data belies claims
of substantial similarity between the OTC interest rate swaps and ex-
change-traded futures.
To understand the underlying economics of convexity bias as
applied to interest rate swap valuation, consider the value of a short-
swap position.61 By convention, the party who receives fixed-rate
payments and makes variable-rate payments holds the short-swap po-
sition. When forward rates fall, the value of the short position in-
creases since the anticipated fixed receipts are more attractive relative
to the anticipated variable-rate payments. Conversely, when forward
rates rise, the value of the short position decreases because the antici-
pated fixed receipts are less attractive relative to the anticipated vari-
able rate payment. Nominally, "the value of the gain on a short swap
when the forward rate falls is equal to the nominal loss on the position
when the forward rate rises. 62 However, since cash flows only occur
on payment dates, anticipated gains and losses must be discounted to
present value. When interest rates fall, the discount rate falls; when
interest rates rise, the discount rate also rises. Therefore, the gain on
the short swap from a decrease in forward rates is worth more than
the loss from an increase in forward rate of equivalent magnitude-
that is, the short swap exhibits positive convexity. In contrast, Euro-
dollar futures positions settle every day according to marking-to-
market requirements. Thus, holders of Eurodollar futures positions
realize gains and losses right away, rather than at some future pay-
ment date. For this reason, Eurodollar futures do not demonstrate
convexity.63 Therefore, the swap rate deduced from futures rates im-
plied from Eurodollar futures prices swaps is generally substantially
different from the market swap rate.
60 See Gupta & Subrahmanyam, supra note 59, at 248-56. The authors test several alter-
native explanations for the differential. Their tests show that variation in default risk does not
substantially explain the variation in the differential, that information asymmetry has an incon-
sequential effect on the differential, and that variation in market liquidity did not substantially
explain variation in the differential. However, the test results show that each of the factors does
have a small but statistically significant effect on the differential in certain circumstances. See
id at 257-64. Gupta and Subrahmanyam admonish readers interested in accurate swap valua-
tion to adjust for convexity bias when using rates derived from futures prices to value interest
rate swaps. See id at 240.




CASE WESTERN RESERVE LA W REVIEW
3. The Clearinghouse
As discussed above, futures market participants do not contract
with one another but with the exchange clearinghouse. The clearing-
house, by guaranteeing counterparty performance, mitigates counter-
party default risk and facilitates closing trades for those holding fu-
tures positions and wanting to unwind their positions before maturity.
Analogous to exchange clearinghouses, market makers in the swap
market, generally large commercial banks, reduce the credit risk of
market participants by facilitating offsetting transactions. Unlike
clearinghouses, however, market makers do not always, and are not
obligated to, stand ready and willing to consummate offsetting trans-
actions with market participants. Thus, market participants desiring
to unwind swap positions must negotiate offsetting transactions with a
market maker, another counterparty, or in the secondary market.
Some inroads to the development of a swap clearinghouse have
been made, but the prospect is not promising in the near term. The
first swap clearinghouse, SwapClear, commenced operations in late
1999. SwapClear offered holders of a limited range of swap positions
clearing services analogous to those available on futures exchanges.
However, SwapClear failed to clear significant volumes,64 probably
because of SwapClear's risk management protocols.65 Recently, a
consortium of banks announced the development of a new electronic
settlement process that its creators hope will capture sixty percent of
the OTC swap market.66 Very few market participants currently exe-
cute transactions through such clearing systems.
II. JURISDICTIONAL AMBIGUITY OF THE ACT PRIOR TO ENACTMENT
OF THE MODERNIZATION ACT
A. Analysis of the Contract for Future Delivery Boundary
The exchange-trading requirement of the Act generally prohibits
execution of contracts for the future delivery of statutory commodities
beyond the rules of exchanges designated by the Commission.
67
Moreover, the Act prohibits deceptive dealing in such transactions.68
6' See Richard Irving, LCH Shunned as Banks Back SwapClear Rival, FIN. NEWS, June 5,
2000, available in LEXIS, Financial News Group File ("Market sources believe that less than a
dozen swaps players have signed up [with SwapClear] and that with the exception of possibly
one U.S. firm, none of the top firms have joined.").
6 See id. ("[T]he limited range of swaps covered by the service as well as a clause stipu-
lating that members must unwind all their positions if in the scheme they are the subject of an
unexpected downgrade by rating agencies.")
.6 See id.
67 See 7 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2000) (noting the prohibition and listing exceptions).




The Act gives the Commission exclusive jurisdiction over transac-
tions falling within the ambit of the Act's jurisdiction.69 Before 1974,
the Act's jurisdiction was limited to contracts for the future delivery
of certain finite commodities. 0 Congress greatly expanded the scope
of the Act's jurisdiction through enactment of the 1974 Act, which
broadened the statutory definition of commodity beyond finite goods
and articles to include any non-finite service, right, or interest that
might potentially form the subject matter of a contract for future de-
livery.' Under this formulation, the statutory definition of commod-
ity, stretched beyond its intuitive meaning,72 affords no limit to the
Act's jurisdiction.73  Accordingly, one had to look elsewhere for ef-
fective bounds. Prior to the enactment of the Modernization Act, the
Act had three statutory jurisdictional boundaries. The critical issue
when analyzing dollar denominated interest rate swaps involved the
scope of the term "contract for future delivery."74
1. The Traditional Model: Anticipated Delivery as Proxy for Inquiry
into Speculative Intent
a. The Traditional Model: Introduction
The Act's jurisdiction extends, if no exemption applies, to trans-
actions involving future delivery of statutory commodities, except
69 See id. § 2(i) (stating scope of exclusive jurisdictions). This grant of exclusive jurisdic-
tion does not restrict other regulatory agencies from carrying out their duties or responsibilities
under federal law. See id. § 2(i)(1).
70 See supra note 6. See also Bartley v. P.G. Commodities Assocs., [1975-1976 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 1 95,394 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (observing that cases interpreting
the old formulation had "uniformly held that a substance not listed by the statute is not within
[the Act's] ambit"); Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440, 442-43 (N.D. 111. 1967)
(holding that copper was not a "commodity" within the meaning of the Act because copper was
not enumerated).
71 See 7 U.S.C. § la(3) ("The term 'commodity' means ... all goods and articles, except
onions ... and all services, rights, and interests in which contracts for future delivery are pres-
ently or in the future dealt in.").
72 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 274 (6th ed. 1990) (defining commodities as "[t]hose
things which are useful or serviceable, particularly articles of merchandise moveable in trade"
and "in referring to commerce may include almost any article of movable or personal prop-
erty"); MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 231-32 (10th ed. 1997) (defining
commodity as an economic good or something useful or valued).
73 See Conroy v. Andeck Resources '81 Year-End Ltd., 484 N.E.2d 525, 531 (IIl. App. Ct.
1985) ("It is clear, both from the legislative history of the [Act] and the amendments thereto and
from the literal wording of these statutes that the legislature intended that all futures contracts,
regardless of the nature of the underlying commodity, are to be governed by the provisions of
the [Act] ....") (emphasis added). But see David M. Lynn, Enforceability of Over-the-Counter
Financial Derivatives, 49 Bus. LAw. 291 (1994) (arguing that the term commodity might still
limit the reach of the Act, and questioning whether interest rates constitute commodities under
the Act).
74 See 7 U.S.C. § 6(a) (providing that it is unlawful to, among other things, execute within
the United States "a contract for the purchase or sale of a commodity for future delivery" unless
the contract is executed under the dominion of an approved contract market).
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those for deferred delivery." Traditionally, the Commission and
courts have proceeded under the assuhiption that Congress intended
the Act to control speculative forward trading in commodities. Ac-
cordingly, the deferred-delivery exception is read narrowly. While
purporting to engage in a fact-intensive, multi-factor analysis, 76 courts
often reduce the analysis to a subjective inquiry-whether contracting
parties contemplated actual delivery of the underlying commodity.77
Under this model, the Commission and the courts tolerate over-
inclusiveness for analytical efficiency. By serving as a proxy for non-
speculative dealing, contemplated delivery obviates the need for more
complex inquiries necessarily involving financial engineering matters.
Adjudicators simply deem executory transactions that do not contem-
plate delivery to be speculative and, thus, not qualified for the de-
ferred-delivery exception. If the goal is to police speculative activity,
the traditional model is over-inclusive since it requires adjudicating
bodies to subject all risk-shifting transactions to the Act's jurisdiction,
whether affected for hedging, speculative, or arbitrage purposes.
One court has demonstrated distaste for the traditional model's
tradeoff, while remaining true to the theory that the Act reflects Con-
gress' s purported distrust of speculative dealing. As discussed below,
Judge Sotomayer rejected the traditional model in favor of an ap-
proach requiring explicit consideration as to whether the transaction
in question advanced speculative ends.78
b. Development of the Traditional Model
The Commission fashioned the traditional model in 1978. At
first, the Commission appeared to have adopted a model much more
71 See id. § l(a)(i 1). The deferred-delivery exception is also known as the cash commod-
ity exception or the cash forward exception.
76 See, e.g., Grain Land Coop v. Kar Kim Farms, Inc., 199 F.3d 983 (8th Cir. 1999). In
Grain Land, the court engaged in an
individualized, multi-factor approach [that] scrutinize[d] each transaction for such
characteristics as whether the parties are in the business of obtaining or producing
the subject commodity; whether they are capable of delivering or receiving the
commodity in the quantities provided for in the contract; whether there is a definite
date of delivery; whether the agreement explicitly requires actual delivery, as op-
posed to allowing the delivery obligation to be rolled indefinitely; whether payment
takes place only upon delivery; and whether the contract's terms are individualized,
rather than standardized.
See id. at 991.
77 See id. ("In order to determine whether a transaction is an unregulated cash-forward
contract, we must decide whether there is a legitimate expectation that physical delivery of the
actual commodity by the seller to the original contracting buyer will occur in the future.") (em-
phasis added) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); CFTC v. Trinity Metals Exch.,
Inc., No. 85-1482-CVW3, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30238, at *8 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 21, 1986) (pos-
iting that the original purpose of the deferred-delivery exception was "to ensure that the [Act]
did not interfere [with transactions] where delivery of the actual grain was expected").
78 See MG Ref. & Mktg. v. Knight Enter., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
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circumscribed than the traditional model in holding that the deferred-
delivery exception applied to all forward transactions except those
effected by "a group of persons whose activities bring them within the
definition of a board of trade." 79 Though the precise jurisdictional
scope of the Act under such a board of trade model is indeterminate
because the statutory definition of board of trade is ambiguous, 80 it
would likely result in a more narrow jurisdictional scope than the tra-
ditional model. Nevertheless, the Commission adopted the more ex-
pansive model within a year. In an interpretive letter released in
1978, the Commission pronounced that the Act's jurisdiction gener-
ally extends to all transactions for the future delivery of statutory
commodities except those
solely for the benefit of persons involved in a commercial
cash commodity business, which would allow them to effect
cash sales of the commodity, contemplating actual delivery
as a matter of course, but in which shipment or delivery of
the commodity might be deferred for purposes of commercial
convenience or necessity.
81
The Commission accentuated the approach soon after. In In re
Stovall, the Commission first applied the traditional model to a con-
troversy. Through the transactional form in question, participants did
not expect delivery of the underlying commodity-the relevant con-
tract was standardized and almost always settled for cash.82 In deter-
mining whether the Stovall contract qualified for the deferred-
delivery exception, the Commission reasoned that Congress meant to
limit its application to those for whom the "desire to acquire or dis-
pose of a physical commodity is the underlying motivation for enter-
ing [the] contract, [but in which] delivery [is] deferred for purposes of
convenience or necessity. '83  Thus, while observing that Stovall's
firm "consistently used and promoted [the contract] as a means of
speculating on changes in the price of cash commodities which might
occur in the future," the Commission held against Stovall solely on
the basis of the lack of intended actual delivery of the underlying
79 CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 77-12 (Dealers in GNMA Certificates Board of Trade),
[1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 20,467 (Aug. 17, 1977).
80 Alton Harris has proposed that a board-of-trade model be adopted. To clarify the board-
of-trade ambiguity, he proposed that that the Act's jurisdiction be limited to contracts executed
on a contract market-contracts marketed and sold to the general public. S e Alton B. Harris,
The CFTC and Derivative Products: Purposeful Ambiguity and Jurisdictional Reach, 71 CHI.
KENT. L. REV. 1117, 1178 (1996).
81 Memorandum to the CFTC from Office of General Council, 44 Fed. Reg. 13,498,
13,498 (1979).
8 See In re Stovall, [Transfer Binder 1977-1980] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,941




CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
commodity.85 Until 1990, the Commission consistently and unambi-
guously reiterated this idea, stressing the expectation of delivery as
the analytical lodestar for determining whether a particular transac-
tion qualifies for the deferred-delivery exception.
86
Courts readily adopted the traditional model.87 The Ninth Cir-
cuit upheld the Commission's approach in its first consideration of
the question. In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Co
Petro Marketing Group, Inc.,88 Co Petro marketed contracts for the
prospective delivery of petroleum products. Under the agreement, the
customer appointed Co Petro as its agent to purchase a specified
quantity and type of product at a future date. The customer paid a
fixed percentage of the forward price as a deposit and was not re-
quired to take delivery, having the option of appointing Co Petro his
agent to sell the fuel on his behalf. If the price went up, Co Petro re-
mitted the difference in price between the forward price and the mar-
ket price to the customer, along with the return of his deposit. If the
price of fuel fell, Co Petro deducted from the deposit the difference
between the forward price and the market price, and sent the balance
back to the customer. A liquidated damages clause limited customer
losses to ninety-five percent of the initial deposit.
In determining whether these contracts qualified for the deferred-
delivery exception, the Ninth Circuit rejected a bright line test be-
cause the appropriate analysis required the court to cast "a critical eye
toward [the transaction's] underlying purpose." 89 Like the Commis-
sion, the critical eye of the Ninth Circuit focused a myopic gaze on
the question of anticipated delivery. While holding that the Co Petro
contract did not qualify for the deferred-delivery exception-because
Co Petro sold the contracts "merely for speculative purposes' '9°0 the
court based its finding of speculative intent on its conclusion that
neither Co Petro nor its customers predicated their dealing on an ex-
85 See id. ("Few, if any, of the transactions entered into were motivated by a desire to
acquire or dispose of actual commodities.") (footnote omitted).
86 See, e.g., Habas v. American Bd. of Trade, Inc., [Transfer Binder 1986-1987] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) T 23,500 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 11, 1987) (holding that contracts in question fell
under the Act's jurisdiction since evidence established that the parties could not have reasonably
expected actual delivery of the underlying commodity and basing its judgement on the stan-
dardized nature of the contracts in question and the implication in the seller's literature that firm
would permitted offset); Characteristics Distinguishing Cash and Forward Contracts and
"Trade" Options, 50 Fed. Reg. 39,656, 39,657-58 (1985) (listing three requirements to qualify
as a contract for deferred delivery: 1) the contract must require delivery of the underlying, 2) the
parties must have the capacity to make delivery and 3) delivery must be intended by the parties).
87 Federal courts generally give statutory interpretation by enforcement agencies "great
weight." See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
844 (1984).
88 680 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1982).
"9 Id. at581.
90 Id. at 579.
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pectation that Co Petro would actually deliver petroleum products.91
Thus, the lesson was that forward contracts not contemplating actual
delivery of the underlying statutory commodity represents the kind of
speculative ventures-that Congress intended the Act to govern. Ap-
parently, the court, with aid from the Commission, taught the lesson
well.92
c. A Challenge to the Traditional Model: The Brent Crude Analysis
After years of faithful observance of the traditional model, the
Commission backed away from its rigid adherence in a 1990 admin-
istrative ruling. The controversy involved the purchase and sale of oil
through a fifteen-day Brent contract. Brent contracts were bilaterally
negotiated deals that typically incorporated standard terms and condi-
tions. While the contracts did not explicitly give counterparties the
right to offset, counterparties usually had ample opportunity to nego-
tiate offsetting transactions. On the basis of this substantial opportu-
nity to offset, a federal district court, applying the logic of the tradi-
9' See id.
92 See Bank Brussels Lambert, S.A. v. Intermetals Corp., 779 F. Supp. 741,749 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (recognizing that courts "have opined [that the deferred-delivery exception] is designed
for purchasers [who] ... expect to take delivery of the commodity ... as distinguished from
purchasers who have no expectation of taking delivery of the commodity in the future, but
merely engaged in a speculation on price change"); CFTC v. Trinity Metals Exch., Inc., No. 85-
1482-CVW3, 1986 U.S. Dist. Lexis 30238, at *31 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 21, 1986) (holding that the
contract did not qualify for the deferred-delivery exception since "speculation, and not delivery
of the actual commodity, [was] the [underlying] purpose of [the contract]"); NRT Metals, Inc. v.
Manhattan Metals, 576 F. Supp. 1046, 1050 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("The exemption referred to is a
narrow one.... [The Act encompasses] the notion that a cash forward contract is one in which
the parties contemplated physical transfer of the actual commodity.") (citations omitted); CFTC
v. National Coal Exch., Inc., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,424
(W.D. Tenn. May 7, 1982) (holding coal purchase agreements as not qualified for the deferred-
delivery exception since investors did not expect delivery of coal); Regulation of Hybrid and
Related Instruments, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,022, 47,023 (1987) (stating that forward transactions
"undertaken principally to assume or shift price risk" without the expectation of "transferring
title" in the underlying commodity do not qualify for the deferred-delivery exception); In re
Frst Nat'l Monetary Corp., [Transfer Binder 1984-1986] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 122,698
(C.F.T.C. Aug. 7, 1985) (holding that forward transactions that afford "participants with an
opportunity to assume or shift the risk of price changes in an underlying commodity without the
forced burden of delivery" fall under the Act's jurisdiction).
Professor Stein has explained the lesson as follows:
neither the [Commission] nor the courts have had difficulty applying the "intent to
deliver" criterion for distinguishing between futures and forwards .... Congress
intended to excuse from the otherwise plenary reach of the exchange-trading re-
quirement only a very narrow class of future-settling contracts that contemplate the
transfer of actual ownership of a commodity in a commercial, merchandising trans-
action. Congress apparently concluded that cash deferred contracts, which contem-
plate the transfer of actual ownership of a commodity, could not be used to manipu-
-late prices. Conversely, future-settling contracts that did not contemplate actual de-
livery, regardless of the nature of the parties involved, posed a sufficient threat to
require that they be traded only on monitored exchanges.
William L. Stein, The Exchange-Trading Requirement of the Commodity Exchange Act, 41
VAND. L REv. 473,492 (1988).
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tional model, held that the fifteen-day Brent contracts did not qualify
for the deferred-delivery exception and thus fell within the Act's ju-
risdiction.93
As Alton Harris has observed, the district court's position in
Transnor put the Commission in a difficult position by effectively
ruling the fifteen-day Brent market illegal under the exchange-trading
requirement. The Commission "could either accept the decision and
its implications-namely, to regulate or prohibit the entire Brent mar-
ket-or reject the Delivery Requirement and permit the Brent market
to continue to operate." 94 The Commission decided to spare the Brent
market, poking a stick into the critical eye of the traditional approach.
The Commission opined that since 1) the parties entered into the
transaction in connection with their business and 2) the contracts in
question contained specific delivery obligations that imposed sub-
stantial delivery-related risks, the contracts constituted deferred-
delivery contracts beyond the Act's jurisdiction.95 While the opinion
did not mark a profound departure from the traditional model, it was
significant. The Commission's focus on contractual form defied the
admonishment of Stovall that the analysis not emphasize contractual
form. Under the Commission's Brent crude approach, a mere risk of
delivery, presented by the absence of contractual terms providing for
offset rather than an expectation of delivery, was enough, under cer-
tain circumstances, to qualify a forward transaction for the deferred-
delivery exception. Hence, the Commission exempted Brent con-
tracts from the Act's jurisdiction when it was given statutory author-
ity to do So.
96
The Ninth Circuit followed the Commission's cue, taking an
analogous approach in Bybee v. A-Mark Precious Metals. 97 In Bybee,
a precious metals retailer, Bybee, arranged to purchase gold and silver
bullion coins for customers from wholesaler, A-Mark. The customers
paid Bybee in full; instead of delivering the metals to his customers,
Bybee arranged for his customers' metals to be stored with A-Mark.
Unbeknownst to the customers, Bybee's arrangement was participa-
tion in A-Mark's deferred-delivery plan. Under the plan, Bybee made
partial payment to A-Mark and A-Mark agreed to make delivery upon
receipt of the balance.98 The balance due was secured by a lien on the
93 See Transnor (Bermuda) Ltd. v. BP North Am. Petroleum, 738 F. Supp. 1472, 1491-92
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (noting that the fifteen-day Brent contracts "routinely settled by means other
than delivery").
94 Harris, supra note 80, at 1131.
95 See Statutory Interpretation Concerning Forward Transactions, 55 Fed. Reg. 39,188
(1990). The Commission stated that its opinion only applied to contracts involving tangible
commodities. See id. at 39,190.
96 See Exemption for Certain Contracts Involving Energy Products, 58 Fed. Reg. 21,286
(1993).
97 945 F.2d 309 (9th Cir. 1991).
9' See id. at 311.
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undelivered metals purchased under the plan. Essentially, A-Mark's
deferred-delivery plan was a margin account. Thus, as the price of
silver fell, A-Mark issued margin calls, which Bybee could not
meet.99 Consequently, A-Mark liquidated Bybee's $2.1 million posi-
tion. While Bybee got $300,000 from the liquidation, he owed his
customers much more. Bybee tried to make up the difference through
commodities speculation, but failed. 00 He eventually declared bank-
ruptcy.'
0
A victim of buzzard's luck in commodities speculation, Bybee,
through his trustee in bankruptcy, petitioned the courts to save him.
He sued for rescission on the basis that the deferred-delivery contracts
constituted illegal off-exchange futures contracts under the Act.102
Notwithstanding the fact that the margin contracts provided specula-
tors a vehicle to bet on the price of metals, the Ninth Circuit held that
the contracts qualified for the deferred-delivery exception since both
parties, acting in connection with their business, had undertaken sub-
stantial commercial risk of delivery.103 Under the plan, "both A-Mark
and Bybee had the legal obligation to make or take delivery upon de-
mand of the other."1 4 Like the Brent crude analysis, contractual form
trumped subjective intent, even though A-Mark tacitly assured pro-
spective customers that it would offset positions on demand. Offset-
ting required a separately negotiated agreement for which neither
party was under obligation to effect. As in the Commission's Brent
crude opinion, the risk of delivery presented by the absence of con-
tractual terms guaranteeing offset supported the application of de-
ferred-delivery exception, even where participants did not expect such
delivery.
d. Reaffirmation of the Traditional Model in the Context of Finite
Commodities
Notwithstanding the previous discussion, recent cases have reaf-




'02 See id. at 312-13.
'03 See id. at 316-17.
'04 Id. at 315.
105 Some lament the traditional model for interpreting the deferred-delivery exception too
broadly. See Glenn L. Norris et al., Hedge to Arrive Contracts and the Commodity Exchange
Act: A Textual Alternative, 47 DRAKE L. REv. 319, 338-39 (1999) (arguing that using contem-
plated delivery as the analytical lodestar results in an overly broad interpretation of the deferred-
delivery exception). Norris and colleagues propose that only transactions involving a sale of
goods under U.C.C. § 1-105, rather than contracts for the sale of future goods, properly fall
under the exception. Under this approach, the underlying commodity would have to be existing
and identified at formation for the contract to qualify for the deferred-delivery exception. Con-
tracts for the sale of future goods, i.e. goods not existing and identified, would not qualify for
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volved enhanced hedge-to-arrive ("enhanced HTA") transactions
between farmers and grain merchants. In these transactions, farmers
generally promise to deliver stated quantities of grain to grain mer-
chants on contractually specified dates. At this point, the farmers are
perfectly hedged against grain price volatility because any change in
value of the short position created by the promise to sell is exactly
offset by the change in the value of the crop. The merchant hedges
his long position in the forward contract by taking a short position in
a traded grain future of comparable expiration (typically, a futures
contract expiring in the same delivery month). Since delivery and the
expiration of the future usually do not coincide, the merchant's hedge
is not perfect and, consequently, the merchant bears some basis risk
(variation in the difference between spot and futures price) for which
farmers generally compensate.
The controversial twist in enhanced HTA contracts is the roll
provision. Enhanced HTAs give farmers the right to defer delivery at
expiration of the HTA. 10 6 The problems start when farmers exercise
deferral rights and, subsequently, sell grain originally committed to
merchants to take advantage of relatively high prices in the spot mar-
ket. By exercising deferral rights and selling their crop in the swap
market, farmers assume naked short positions in grain. Essentially,
the farmers bet that a decrease in grain prices will allow them to pur-
chase cover-grain relatively cheaply.
Unfortunately for farmers undertaking the bet, an unusually
prolonged rise in grain prices occurred in the mid-1990s. Enhanced
HTAs do not give farmers rights to defer indefinitely. 10 7 Farmers en-
gaging in sell-high and cover-low strategies, expecting grain prices to
fall according to typical price patterns, lost big as merchants de-
manded delivery when cover-grain prices were relatively high.108 The
enhanced HTA cases involved farmers attempts to avoid their losses.
Lawyers representing farmers, working to save their clients from
huge losses, put on clinics in contractual defense. One of the favored
contractual defenses was based on the doctrine of illegality: °9 The
farmers' advocates contended that enhanced HTA constituted illegal,
unenforceable, off-exchange futures transactions under the Act since
the deferred-delivery exception even when parties contemplate delivery. See id. But see Ed-
ward M. Mansfield, Textualism Gone Astray: A Reply to Norris, Davison, and May on Hedge to
Arrive Contracts, 47 DRAKE L. REv. 745, 746, 759-60 (1999) (criticizing Norris and colleagues'
interpretive proposal and supporting the traditional model).
106 See Nagel v. ADM Investor Serv. Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 740, 748 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
'07 See id.




the HTA forwards did not qualify for the deferred-delivery excep-
tion. l l °
The federal circuits that have considered the controversy have
uniformly rejected the farmers' illegality defense. However, in doing
so, the circuits have uniformly reaffirmed the traditional model. In
Lachmund v. ADM Investor Services, Inc.," the Seventh Circuit held
that the enhanced HTA contract in question qualified for the deferred-
delivery exception because the counterparties contemplated actual
delivery; thus, contemplated actual delivery was the fundamental
factor in interpreting the deferred-delivery exception.1 2  The court
reasoned that, in contrast to forward contracts contemplating actual
delivery, futures contracts serve as "mechanisms used to shift price
risk."'  Holding fast to the distrust of risk-shifting transactions in-
herent in the traditional model, the court suggested that Congress
limited the deferred-delivery exception to contracts through which the
parties contemplate actual delivery because such transactions "did not
present the same opportunities for speculation, manipulation and out-
right wagering that trading in futures... presented.",
ha
Correspondingly, the Sixth Circuit, in The Andersons, Inc. v.
Horton Farms, Inc., ' 5 held that an enhanced HTA contract qualified
for the deferred-delivery exception on the basis of the inherent value
of the underlying commodity to the counterparties." 6 Like the Sev-
enth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit held fast to the traditional model,
opining that Congress enacted the Act to control speculative transac-
tions, as distinguished from transactions in commodities having "'in-
herent value' to the transacting parties."'" 7 The court suggested that
risk-shifting activity constitutes an abuse akin to market manipula-
tion.118 Like the Seventh Circuit, the court considered expected actual
1to The farmers' position had support in a Commission administrative ruling. See Com-
petitive Strategies for Agric., Ltd., [1998-1999 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. 27,771
(C.F.T.C. Aug. 24, 1998) (holding that the deferred-delivery exception did not apply to an en-
hanced HTA contract because, among other things, "the contract provided an effective means of
discharge or offset that was, in practice, used routinely to liquidate the contract for cash with no
delivery of grain required" and "the contract was marketed, entered into and structured as a
means of capturing price movements in the futures markets, not as a vehicle for delivery"). See
also Charles F. Reid, Note, Risky Business: HTAs, the Cash Forward Exclusion and Top of
Iowa Cooperative v. Schewe, 44 ViLL. L. REv. 125, 133-37 (1999) (arguing that the enhanced
HTA structure might not qualify for the deferred-delivery exception because its features ac-
commodate speculation).
... 191 F.3d 777 (7thCir. 1999).
"2 See id. at 787-88 ("The document itself will reveal whether the agreement contemplates
actual delivery...
,"3 Id. at786.
114 Id. (quoting Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 8 F.3d 966,970-71 (4th Cir. 1993)).
"5 166 F.3d 308 (6th Cir. 1998).
116 See id. at318, 322.
17 ld. at 318 (citation omitted).
11 See id.
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delivery the critical factor in interpreting the deferred-delivery excep-tion.1 19
The Eighth Circuit's statement on enhanced HTAs followed this
trend, criticizing suggestions that the traditional model be scrapped in
favor of a contractually focused test. Following a mocking acknowl-
edgment that focusing on contractual form would make the analysis
much easier, the court opined that such a myopic approach would
hinder judicial efforts to administer faithfully the "congressional poli-
cies underlying the vague text [of the Act]."120 The court concluded
that adherence to the analytics of the traditional model was necessary
to advance the Act's policy. 1
21
2. The Sotomayor Alternative
While adhering to the idea that Congress intended the Act's ju-
risdiction to reach forward transactions executed for speculative pur-
poses, Judge Sotomayor rejected the reliance on contemplated deliv-
ery as a proxy for non-speculative intent. Judge Sotomayor argued
that transactions executed for hedging purposes should qualify for the
deferred-delivery exception even in the absence of contemplated de-
livery or substantial commercial risk of delivery. Judge Sotomayor
employed this approach in MG Refining and Marketing, Inc. v. Knight
Enterprises, Inc., 22 which involved an after-effect of MG Refining's
storied marketing debacle.
119 See id. See also CFTC v. Noble Metals Int'l, Inc., 67 F.3d 766 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding
that counterparties must contemplate actual delivery for a forward transaction to qualify for the
deferred-delivery exclusion; forward contracts on precious metals that required the buyer to take
title but not actual delivery deemed within the scope of Act); Salomon Forex, 8 F.3d at 970-71
("Transactions in the commodity itself which anticipate actual delivery [do] not present the
same opportunities for speculation, manipulation, and outright wagering that trading in futures
and options [presents]."); CFTC v. Hanover Trading Corp., 34 F. Supp. 2d 203, 205, 205 n.14
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("The lack of an expectation that delivery of the physical commodity will be
made is an important factor indicating the presence of a futures contract .... A 'cash forward'
contract... is one in which the buyer enters into the contract in contemplation or expectation of
taking physical delivery.") (footnote and citation omitted); Johnson v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 18 F.
Supp. 2d 985, 995 (N.D. Iowa 1998) (holding that the enhanced HTA contract in question quali-
fied for the deferred-delivery exception on the basis that the parties expected delivery since "the
contracts, taken as a whole," established a delivery price for grain). Cf. 1 TIMOTHY J. SNIDER,
REGULATION OF THE COMMODITIES FUTURES AND OPTIONS MARKETS § 9.07, at 9-14 (2d ed.
1995) (observing that the deferred-delivery "exclusion has been narrowly construed to date and
it is anticipated that this construction will be continued in the future" and that cash settled for-
ward contracts are likely within the Act's jurisdiction); Ned Swan, Electricity Derivatives
Regulation Mired in Uncertainty, ELECTRIc LIGHT & POWER, Feb. 1999, at 19 (distinguishing
forward contracts from futures contracts with reference to the cash settlement option inherent in
futures contracts).
120 Grain Land Coop v. Kar Kim Farms, 199 F.3d 983, 992 (8th Cir. 1999).
121 See id. (concluding that the analysis must focus on "whether there is a legitimate ex-
pectation that physical delivery of the actual commodity by the seller to the original contracting
buyer will occur in the future") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
122 25 F. Supp. 2d 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
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Following a rather novel marketing strategy, MG Refining
agreed to sell customers specified quantities of petroleum every
month at a fixed price six to eight cents above market price at contract
formation. MG Refining hedged its exposure to oil-price risk with
long positions in petroleum futures. MG Refining executives planned
that gains in their stacked hedge futures position would offset short-
position losses vis-i-vis customers. However, MG Refining execu-
tives did not appreciate the effects of funding risk inherent in their
plan. When oil prices fell, MG Refining realized the losses from its
futures hedge position immediately while the gains from its positions
with customers would only be realized over time.123 Eventually, in
late 1993, the losses on the futures positions became so staggering
that MG Refining's parent ordered the liquidation of all futures posi-
tions.124 (The wisdom of MG Refining's liquidation is controversial.
Some assert that the strategy would have succeeded had it been exe-
cuted to fruition, while others maintain that the strategy was fatally
flawed.) l25 Once MG Refining's futures positions were unwound at a
loss of $1.33 billion, MG Refining wished to sever its unhedged
commitments to customers by repudiating certain long-term commit-
ments ("flexies").
In 1994, following the marketing debacle, the enforcement arm
of the Commission investigated whether MG Refining's flexies con-
stituted illegal off-exchange futures contracts. Recognizing an op-
portunity to avoid its contractual commitments, MG Refining made
an offer of settlement, eventually accepted by the Commission. The
resulting order, among other things,
declared the contracts to be illegal off-exchange futures con-
tracts and required MG to certify within five days that it had
notified all Purchasers of existing [contracts] that the Com-
mission [had] entered [an order] finding that the [contracts]
[were] illegal and therefore void ... and directing [MG] to
cease and desist from violating the relevant sections of the
[Act]. 126
Happy to cooperate, MG Refining informed its customers that further
performance on contracts effected pursuant to the marketing plan was
barred by order of the Commission. Nevertheless, MG Refining's
123 See Anatoli Kuprianov, Derivatives Debacles: Case Studies of Large Losses in Deriva-
tives Markets, 81 ECON. Q., Fall 1995, at 1, 6-7.
124 See id. at 7.
'25 See id. at 7, 13-18.
12 MG Refining, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 178 (sixth and seventh alterations in original) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
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customers demanded performance. 127 When MG Refining refused, its
customers sued. 128
MG Refining's petition asked for summary judgment based on
the Commission's order declaring the contracts illegal under the
Act. 129 The customers' summary judgment petition responded that
the contracts qualified for the deferred-delivery exception and, thus,
were legal under the Act. 130 The contracts in question were typical
forwards with a critical twist-they contained a blow-out provision,
giving purchasers the right to cash-out without taking delivery in the
event of a price spike. A contractual price spike occurred when the
futures price of certain petroleum futures trading on the New York
Mercantile Exchange rose higher than the contractually stated price.
Although customers were ostensibly committed to take delivery of a
significant amount of gasoline or heating oil, only a few actually had
the capacity to take physical delivery and no customer ever requested
such delivery. The court observed that
although the right to cash out the flexies was triggered only
during price spikes, the record contain[ed] ample evidence..
. that the chance of a price spike occurring within the terms
of the flexies was objectively very high, and price spikes suf-
ficient to trigger the blow-out provisions did in fact occur in
every case.
The customers' argument was based on a perceived assertion in
the Commission's Brent crude opinion and in Bybee that the tradi-
tional model had been displaced by a more objective test. They ar-
gued that, notwithstanding the intent of the parties, the "contracts
should be considered [legal deferred-delivery] contracts whenever
they are entered into between commercial parties in connection with
their businesses, and when the contracts set forth specific delivery
obligations imposin on the parties substantial economic risks of a
commercial nature.
Judge Sotomayor first rejected this argument, concluding that no
displacement had occurred, maintaining the customers had overstated
the implications of the Brent crude opinion and Bybee. 133 She criti-
cized the customers' "careless abstraction" of legal principles from
the facts that gave rise to them: "[I]t was only in [the] specific context
[of the case] that the [Commission] concluded that cashed-out 15-day
127 See id.
'2 See id.
129 See id. at 185.
30 See id. at 180-81.
131 Id. at 185 (footnote omitted).
132 Id. at 182.
131 See id. at 183.
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Brent contracts ought to be considered agreements appurtenant to the
more primary goal of obtaining deferred delivery of underlying com-
modities. ' ' 34 Judge Sotomayor held that, instead of suggesting a
more contractually focused analysis, the Commission's Brent crude
opinion actually affirmed the traditional model's focus on subjective
intent in most cases. Limiting the implication of the Brent crude
opinion to its facts, she held that the opinion merely suggested that
that the use of the anticipated delivery as the analytical touchstone
might not be appropriate where the parties do not contemplate actual
delivery but nevertheless undertake a substantial commercial risk of
delivery:
In fact, far from undermining the traditional forward
contract analysis, the CFrC explicitly reiterated the propo-
sition that to identify a forward contract, the transaction[s]
must be viewed as a whole, with a critical eye towards
[their] underlying purpose.... Although the CFrC decided
to de-emphasize the importance of routine physical delivery
in discerning the purposes of the 15-day Brent contracts, the
[Commission] found it particularly salient, in reaching this
decision, that the 15-day Brent contracts contained no right
of offset, [did] not rely on a variation margining and settle-
ment system, and [did] not permit assignment of contractual
obligations without counterparty consent. The CFTC deci-
sion thus indicated its expert opinion that contracts contain-
ing no rights to offset, but that are nevertheless cashed out
pursuant to separately negotiated agreements, should not be
deemed to serve a speculative purpose just because they do
not end in physical delivery.13
5
Judge Sotomayor disposed of Bybee similarly, maintaining that the
Ninth Circuit had "second[ed] the proposition.., that when contracts
for future delivery give neither party a right to cash out, but are still
cash settled pursuant to independently negotiated agreements, ab-
sence of physical delivery alone should not be deemed to imply that
the contracts served merely speculative purposes."'136 While she
doubted that anticipated delivery should be the analytical touchstone
for determining qualification for the deferred-delivery exception in all
cases, Judge Sotomayor reaffirmed the principle that the underlying




'35 Id. at 183-84 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks, citations, and footnote
omitted).
'3 Id. at 184.
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After rejecting the customers' analysis of the implications of
Brent crude and Bybee, Judge Sotomayor considered whether the
contract in question qualified for the deferred-delivery exception.
She rejected the customers' argument that contracts qualified for the
exception as a matter of law. In denying customers' summary judg-
ment motion, Judge Sotomayor applied the logic of the Brent crude
opinion, distinguishing the contacts in question from the Brent con-
tracts and the margin contracts in Bybee on the basis of the differen-
tial in commercial risk presented. 138 The contracts in question gave
customers the right to offset upon the occurrence of a highly probable
condition. Moreover, uncontested evidence established that, even in
the extremely unlikely event that the price spike condition did not
occur, MG Refining "indicated in its sales pitches that the flexies
would.., be 'rolled over', and their terms extended" until such time
that a blow-out occurred. 139 Finally, uncontested evidence established
that most customers utilizing flexies lacked the capacity to take
physical delivery of petroleum product and, in fact, no customer ever
requested such delivery. To Judge Sotomayer, the risk of physical
delivery was clearly negligible. In contrast, the Brent contracts af-
forded the counterparties no right to offset, contingent or otherwise;
offset would have required a separately negotiated agreement. Thus,
the Brent crude market "remain[ed] one based on physical trading"
that required participants to undertake "substantial risk[s] of a com-
mercial nature, including those of demurrage, damage, theft or dete-
rioration of the commodity as well as other risks associated with
owning the commodity delivered., 140  Analogously, Bybee could
have only gained a right of offset from A-Mark though additional
dickering. Judge Sotomayer determined from the uncontested evi-
dence that the customers neither contemplated actual delivery nor
faced a substantial risk of such delivery.
Under such circumstances, a court using the traditional model
would have granted MG Refining's summary judgment.141 However,
Judge Sotomayor denied MG Refining's motion, refusing to expose
the contracts in question to the Act's jurisdiction on the sole basis of a
lack of contemplated delivery and an insubstantial risk of delivery. In
doing so, Judge Sotomayor effectively rejected the traditional model.
She maintained that forward contracts qualify for the deferred-
delivery exception when such contracts are "entered into primarily as
ways of shifting future price risks incidental to commercial operations
and other forward commitments" rather than "to speculate on an un-
regulated futures market price, thereby obtaining a second source of
138 See id.
39 Id. at 186.
140 Id. at 183 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
'4' See id. at 188.
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income." 42 She determined that the speculative purposes issue was a
question of fact appropriate for jury resolution. 4 3
The traditional model carries the policy crusade against specula-
tive dealing so far that any risk-shifting transaction is deemed to be
"speculative," even if the actual purposes involve hedging or arbi-
trage. While accepting the anti-speculation bias, Judge Sotomayor
rejects the anticipated delivery proxy. Her approach would require
courts to make explicit inquiry into nature of the forward transactions
to determine such transactions were executed primarily for hedging
purposes.
3. The Easterbrook Model: Nagel v. ADM Investor Services, Inc.
Acceptance of the idea that interpretation of "contract for future
delivery" turns on subjective intent, whether determined by proxy or
actual analysis, is not universal. Judge Easterbrook, sitting by desig-
nation in federal district court, issued a stinging rebuke to the propo-
sition that all executory contracts, except those qualifying for the de-
ferred-delivery exception, fall within the Act's jurisdiction. Nagel v.
ADM Investor Services, Inc.144 involved enhanced HTA deals gone
bad-farmers looking to avoid performance by characterizing the
contracts in question as illegal off-exchange futures contracts. Unlike
other courts, Judge Easterbrook did not focus on the deferred-delivery
exception. Rather, his analysis focused on whether the enhanced
HTAs under consideration constituted contracts for future delivery at
all.1
45
Judge Easterbrook's iconoclastic approach was unnecessary to
his holding that the contracts in question were beyond the Act's juris-
diction. He could have reached the same conclusion applying the tra-
ditional model. 146  Yet the Commission had suggested aggressive
regulation of OTC derivative markets.' 47 While he did not explicitly
say so, it may be that Judge Easterbrook realized that under the logic
of the traditional model, the Act's jurisdiction would envelop the
OTC derivatives markets, and he took the opportunity to offer an al-
ternative model of the Act's jurisdiction.
142 Id. at 188.
14 See id. (holding that a jury question remained not only as to the contractual language,
but also as to the facts surrounding negotiations).
14 65 F. Supp. 2d 740, 751 (N.D. 11. 1999) (Easterbrook, Cir. J.), amended by 1999 WL
966437 (N.D. Ill. 1999), aFfd, 217 F.3d 436 (7th Cir. 2000).
145 See id. at 748 (noting that the "centerpiece of the suit" was whether the enhanced HTA
contracts were futures contracts).
146 See id. at 751 (stating a strong inclination to reach the same holding under the tradi-
tional model).
147 See Concept Release Concerning Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 64 Fed. Reg. 65,669
(1998).
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a. Judge Easterbrook's Rationale for Rejecting the Traditional
Model
Judge Easterbrook offered three doctrinal justifications for his
rejection of the traditional model and, implicitly, Judge Sotomayer's
alternative. First, he suggested that courts employing the traditional
model misread the Act. The traditional model assumes "that every
contract for delivery in the future is a 'contract for future delivery'
and therefore must be traded as a futures contract, and then turn[s] to
the [deferred-delivery] exception."'148 This approach, wrote Judge
Easterbrook, assumes that the term has a "lay rather than a technical
meaning.' 149 Alternatively, he reasoned that "the language has a
technical reference - that the statute specifies the kind of contracts
that trade inffutures markets."150
Judge Easterbrook thought a technical interpretation appropriate
because the popular lay interpretation implied an absurdly broad
reading of the Act's jurisdiction.15 To illustrate his point, he asked
the reader to imagine a world under the Grain Futures Act ("GFA"),
the predecessor to the Act: "Can it be that until 1936 all commercial
contracts for future delivery of newspapers, coal, ice, oil, gas, milk,
bread, electricity, and so on were unlawful futures contracts? 1 52 An-
swering his own question, he concluded: "Surely the answer is no,
which means that 'contract for future delivery' must have a technical
rather than a lay meaning."1 53 The problem with the illustration is
that it assumes wider jurisdictional scope for the GFA than the Act
actually had. Congress limited the scope of the GFA to certain enu-
merated grains. 154 It did not extend to the commodities mentioned by
Judge Easterbrook. Due to the narrow scope of commodity under the
GFA, the lay interpretation of "contract for future delivery" would not
have had the absurd implications it has today. The truly absurd im-
plications arise from the 1974 Act, which amended "commodity" to
include virtually anything that might form the subject matter of a for-
ward contract.
When one considers the institutional capacity of the Commis-
sion, the soundness of Judge Easterbrook's argument is apparent.
Under the traditional model, most OTC derivatives would fall under
the Act's jurisdiction because, prior to the enactment of the Moderni-
zation Act, the traditional model extended the Act's jurisdiction to all
cash-settled forward transactions that did not qualify for the deferred-
148 Nagel, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 751.
149 Id.




'-4 See supra note 7.
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delivery exception. Essentially, Judge Easterbrook argued that a
reading of "contract for future delivery" that would theoretically, if
not in practice, expose much of the OTC derivative market to the
Act's jurisdiction simply cannot be right.155  The Commission is a
relatively small agency, institutionally incapable of policing the OTC
derivative markets, as its chairman admitted1 56 while supporting a
report that recommended explicit statutory limits on the Commis-
sion's power to regulate such markets. 157 Moreover, important policy
makers argue that the Commission's technical competence is limited
to futures trading on finite commodities, especially agricultural com-
modities. In this vein, Alan Greenspan brushed off the Commission's
role in financial regulation. 58 The upshot is that a reading of the Act
that implies a regulatory scope for the Commission far beyond its ca-
pacity is unreasonable. At least, the technical interpretation advo-
cated by Judge Easterbrook would have bound the Commission to the
limits of its competence. The broad exemptions for financial deriva-
tives enacted though the Modernization Act suggest that this view has
achieved critical salience.
Judge Easterbrook also deemed the use of intended delivery as
"the defining characteristic" of an exempt forward contract "implau-
sible."'159 He noted that all futures contracts, like OTC forwards, re-
quire future delivery of the underlying commodity. Use of intended
delivery as a jurisdictional touchstone creates indeterminacy because
it "treats as the dividing line something the two forms of contract
have in common-not only in the statutory text but also in the com-
mercial world."'160 Proponents of the traditional model argue that,
while parties to futures contracts have the right to make or take deliv-
ery, less than three percent actually do so. While this is so, Judge
Easterbook noted that institutional differences explain the differential
155 See Nagel, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 754 (criticizing the Norris, Davidson, and May argument
that only contracts on commodities identified at formation qualify for the deferred-delivery
exception).
15 See Dean Anason, Futures Commission Head: OTC Oversight Unnecessary, AM.
BANKER, Dec. 8, 1999, at 2 (arguing that the Act was not designed to regulate OTC deriva-
tives).
15 See Pamela Barnett, Presidential Group Pushes Derivatives Market Changes, NAT'L J.
CONGRESS DAiLY, Nov. 9, 1999, available in LEXIS, National Journal's CongressDaily file.
"s5 See Derivatives Market Regulation: Hearing Before the Comm. on Agriculture, Nutri-
tion and Forestry of the U.S. Senate, 105th Cong. 17 (1998) (statement of Alan Greenspan,
Chairman, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System); cf. The President's Working Group
on Financial Markets Report on Over-the-Counter Markets and the Commodity Exchange Act:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Risk Management, Research, and Specialty Crops of the
Comm. on Agriculture, 106th Cong. 22 (2000) (recommending that the existing regulatory re-
gimes applicable to financial futures be reviewed "to determine whether they are appropriately
tailored to serve valid regulatory goals").
159 Nagel, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 751.
160 id.
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rates of settlement by delivery.1 61 A better approach, according to
Judge Easterbrook, involves a comparison of institutional character-
istics. Accordingly, courts need not "depart from the technical under-
standing of a futures contract, and much mischief has been caused by
the attempt."' 62
Finally, Judge Easterbrook rejected the traditional model because
of the legal uncertainty it inspired. William J. Rainer, Commission
chairman, admitted that legal uncertainty was a problem in the OTC
derivative markets and that the establishment of "clear legal cer-
tainty" was imperative to achieving "[t]he national interest in foster-
ing economic efficiency and competition in the OTC derivatives mar-
ket."163 Judge Easterbrook explained the effect of legal uncertainty in
the capital markets:
It is essential to know beforehand whether a given contract
is a futures or a forward. The answer determines who, if
anyone, may enter into such a contract, and where trading
may occur. Contracts allocate price risk, and they fail in
that office if it can't be known until years after the fact
whether a given contract was lawful.' 64
Judge Easterbrook thought that misreading "contract for future deliv-
ery" was at the heart of legal uncertainty in the OTC derivative mar-
kets. 1
65
b. Support in Case Law for the Easterbrook Approach
While the traditional model achieved widespread acceptance
in cases involving forward contracts on finite commodities, it does
not appear to be salient in the relatively few cases analyzing for-
ward contracts on non-finite commodities. Intangible commodi-
ties entails those "services, rights, and interests" capable of being
the subject matter of a forward-type contract within the scope of
the Act as a result of the 1974 Act. 166  Some courts have been
willing to rely on a technical understanding of futures contract in
analyzing whether the Act's jurisdiction extended to the transac-
tions in question.' 67
161 See id. at 754 (applying an analysis of institutional differences to the enhanced HTA
contracts in question).
162 Id.
163 Anason, supra note 156, at 2.
" Nagel, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 752.
165 See id. (reasoning that the traditional model "produces undesirable uncertainty").
166 7 U.S.C. § I(a)(3) (2000).
167 Such an approach had additional support in commentary. See, e.g., JERRY MARKHAM,
THE HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING AND ITS REGULATION 233 (1987) (arguing
that standardized and easily offset swap agreements should be subject to the Act due to their
similarity to futures contracts); Willa E. Gibson, Are Swap Agreements Securities or Futures?:
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1. Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. SEC. The Seventh Circuit
implicitly employed Easterbrook's approach in Chicago Mercantile
Exchange v. SEC. 168 In that case, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
challenged the SEC's approval of stock exchange-traded "index par-
ticipations" ("IP") on certain exchanges regulated by the SEC. -IPs
were contracts of indefinite duration whose value derived from secu-
rities indexes such as the S&P 500 or the Dow Jones Industrial Aver-
age. The case turned on whether IPs constituted contracts for future
delivery, since, under the Act, the Commission had exclusive juris-
diction over such contracts.' 69 Unfortunately for all involved, IPs did
not fit neatly into any extant regulatory paradigm.
On one hand, buyers of IP contracts paid cash on the day of sale
in exchange for a promise by the seller to pay a quarterly cash flow
based on dividends paid on the stocks underlying the index to which
the IPs were tied and to allow buyer to cash-out of the IP on prede-
termined days. From the buyer's perspective, the court noted that IPs
had "properties similar to those of a closed-end mutual fund holding a
value-weighted portfolio of the securities in the index: the IPs last
indefinitely, pay dividends, and may be traded freely; on cash-out day
the IP briefly becomes open-end, and the investor can withdraw cash
without making a trade in the market.'
170
On the other hand, the court noted sellers "s[aw] the IP as a
speculative or hedging instrument scarcely distinguishable from a
futures contract that terminates on the cash-out day, plus an option
held by the long to roll over the contract to the next cash-out
date.''"  Comparing the difficulties raised by the issue to difficul-
ties one would encounter in deciding whether "tetrahedrons belong
in square or round holes,"'72 the Seventh Circuit concluded that the
IPs were similar enough to standardized exchange-, cash-settled
futures contracts to fall within the Act's jurisdiction and, thus, the
Commission's regulatory purview.173
2. Abrams v. Oppenheimer Government Services, Inc. The
Seventh Circuit made more explicit use of this approach in Abrams v.
Oppenheimer Government Services, Inc. 174  Abrams involved a
The Inadequacies of Applying the Traditional Regulatory Approach to OTC Derivatives Trans-
actions, 24 . CoRP. L. 379, 401-405 (1999) (concluding that only forward contracts embodying
institutional features inherent to exchange-traded futures contracts properly fall under the Act's
jurisdiction); London Clearing House Does Not Need CFTC Exemption, ISDA Says, 4 DE-
RIVATIVES LIG. REP. 10 (1998) (reporting ISDA's conclusion that "[s]waps are not subject to
regulation under the Commodity Exchange Act because they are not futures contracts").
'68 883 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1989).
'69 See 7 U.S.C. § 2(a).
'70 Chicago Mercantile Exch., 883 F.2d at 540.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 539.
'73 See kL at 548.
'74 737 F.2d 582 (7th Cir. 1984).
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forward contract on Government National Mortgage Association is-
sued mortgage-backed securities that called for settlement four
months after the contract date. The controversy arose when the mar-
ket value of the securities declined due to the increase in mortgage
prepayments precipitated by a decline in interest rate volatility. The
plaintiff complained that Oppenheimer misrepresented the sensitivity
in the value of the securities to a decline in interest rates and invoked,
among other things, the anti-deception provisions of the securities
laws. 75 The Seventh Circuit accepted the case to determine whether
a forward contract on securities constituted a "purchase or sale" of a
security.
Defendants, looking to establish the jurisdictional exclusivity of
the Act, 176 argued that securities laws did not apply because the for-
wards in question were indistinguishable from exchange-traded fu-
tures. While the court noted that retail customers routinely executed
such transactions to speculate on the price of the securities, 177 the
court distinguished the forward transaction in question from futures
mainly on the basis that the forwards were bilaterally negotiated
rather than standardized instruments. 178 Moreover, the court, antici-
pating the Commission's Brent crude logic, stated that a mere possi-
bility of a negotiated offset did not compel a finding that the contract
in question constituted a futures contract. 179 The critical aspect of
Abrams is the rejection of speculative intent as a criterion for decision
and its focus, albeit far from rigorous, on the institutional differences
between forwards and futures.
B. The Status of Interest Rate Swaps Under the Act Prior to the
Commodity Futures Modernization Act
1. Analysis Under the Traditional Model
Prior to enactment of the Modernization Act, cash-settled for-
ward transactions generally fell within the Act's jurisdiction via the
traditional model because parties to such contracts cannot by the na-
ture of the transaction contemplate actual delivery of a statutory
commodity, including interest rate swaps. Thus, OTC interest rate
175 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and rules thereunder, prohibit deceptive conduct
"in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." 15 U.S.C. § 78(j)(b) (2000); see also
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2000).
'76 See 7 U.S.C. § 2(i) (2000) ("The [Commission] shall have exclusive jurisdiction ...
[over] transactions involving contracts for the sale of a commodity for future delivery ... .
177 See Abrams, 737 F.2d at 584.
178 See id. at 590 (noting that unlike standardized instruments, "[f]orward contracts allow
purchasers to negotiate, inter alia, the quantity of the commodity.., the time and place of de-
livery, the manner of payment, and deposit or margin requirements").See id. at 591 n.12 (stating that the sale and delivery of these securities are not prerequi-
sites to the formation of a contract).
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swaps not qualifying for the administrative safe harbor would have
violated the exchange-trading requirement of the Act and been unen-
forceable in contract.18 0  Moreover, participants in such transactions
would have been exposed to civil penalties, criminal penalties, and
private suitsjl8 Even swaps enjoying the grace of the regulatory safe
harbor exemption would have been subject to Commission policing
pursuant to the anti-fraud provisions of the Act.
182
Since subjecting OTC swap contracts to analysis under the tradi-
tional model would have had significant negative implications for the
continued efficacy of that market, application required strong justifi-
cation. Such justification was lacking. First, the suspicion of risk
shifting at the heart of the traditional model draws its strength from
rather dubious historical 8 3 and economic frameworks.184  Second,
18o See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
181 See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
"2 See 7 U.S.C. § 6b (2000) (listing antifraud provisions of the Act), amended by Pub. L.
No. 554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000); id § 6o (same).
18 See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Or-
dering in the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DuKE LJ. 701, 705 (1999). Professor Stout
maintains that the Act embodies the spirit of old common law antipathy toward speculative
forward dealings, asserting the Act "reincamates, in modified statutory form, the common law
rule requiring contracts of sale for future delivery to be settled by actual delivery." Id. at 722.
Jerry Markham captures the anti-speculation bias in his explanation of the 1974 Act. He main-
tains that Congress enacted the 1974 Act in reaction to the perception that the old regime could
not effectively protect the public against speculators and manipulators. See Markham, supra
note 56, at 14 n.49. In addition, wild volatility in commodities prices of the 1970s fueled that
perception. As food prices fluctuated violently in the wake of the Bretton Woods collapse, and
investors in commodity options lost millions in a series of high profile brokerage failures, public
interest activists blamed underhanded dealers and speculative traders for the turmoil. See id.
The Des Moines Register, a voice for farm interests, captured the zeitgeist in a series of articles
attacking the Act as an inadequate guardian of the public interest against self-interested specu-
lators. See MARKHAM, supra note 167, at 58-59.
But consider another explanation offered from the public choice perspective. While anti-
speculation sentiment appeared to have provided some impetus for the first federal commodity
futures legislation, proponents of the public choice explanation argue that the attack on specula-
tion provided cover for the strategic aims of farm groups. Following the post-World War I
collapse in grain prices, farm interests came to support the idea of cooperative enterprise to
support grain prices. Professor Romano posits that the agricultural interests ultimately moved
against futures markets to protect the expected monopolistic profitability of the burgeoning farm
cooperatives. See Roberta Romano, The Political Dynamics of Derivatives Securities Regula-
tion, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 279, 309-10 (1997). Strategically, then, a desire among farm interests
to enjoy the fruits of market power lies at the heart of farm interests' drive for a federal "regu-
latory toehold" over futures markets. See id. at 309-12.
Regarding the 1974 Act, Professor Romano posits that the farm interests who attacked
futures trading did so preemptively to forestall legislation in response to consumer anxiety over
volatile food prices that could harm their interests. See id. at 334-35. Unlike previous attacks
on futures markets, farm interests' assault on the futures market in the 1970s was muted, even
ambivalent, and did not provide a substantial impetus for the enactment of the 1974 Act. See id.
at 335. Romano presents evidence that "legislators and self-described consumer advocacy
groups" provided decisive impetus, asserting that political gaming explains enactment of the
1974 Act. See id. At the time, federal legislators did not grasp the significance of extending the
scope of the Act to non-consumable commodities. See id. at 337 (noting that "few witnesses ...
[testifying on the advisability of the amendment] foresaw that the market Would shift dramati-
cally away from a predominance of agricultural products in a few years"). The creation of an
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concern over systemic risk did not justify aggressive Commission
policing of the OTC swap market since systemic risk is better dealt
with at an entity, rather than transactional, level.1 5 Third, price ma-
nipulation is not relevant for swap transactions involving non-finite
independent agency was thought to be the critical aspect of the 1974 Act. Professor Romano
reasons that the measure appealed to a majority of federal legislators because "it strengthened
congressional control of public policy, and in particular that of the Democratic majority, against
that of the Republican administration. Creating an independent agency was an attempt to lever-
age congressional influence in an era of divided government." Id. at 330. Thus, the argument
that Congress intended that OTC derivatives fall within the Act's jurisdiction does not bear
scrutiny.
184 See, e.g., Stout, supra note 183, at 741-45. For example, Professor Stout offers a noise
trading model, dubbed the heterogeneous exceptions model, to explain much activity in the
OTC derivative markets. The model assumes that pure differences in belief, as distinguished
from hedging or arbitrage activity, motivate a substantial subset of trades in the financial mar-
kets. Professor Stout argues that disagreement-based trading is a zero-sum endeavor. When
transaction costs are considered, the disagreement-based trades impose deadweight losses on the
economy. Accordingly, Professor Stout concludes that a "sophisticated analysis of the deriva-
tives market that incorporates the lessons of the HE model ... offers the unsettling prediction
that derivatives trading can be the source of efficiency losses as well as efficiency gains" and
provides normative support for aggressive Commission regulation of the OTC swap market on
the basis that some authority or mechanism is need to suppress wealth reducing activity while
promoting wealth enhancing activity. Id. at 773. According to Professor Stout, aggressive
Commission oversight of derivatives trading might produce welfare gains by sifting out such
trading. See id. at 785.
Professor Stout also cleverly appeals to the casino economics criticism of financial mar-
kets. See Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure,
and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611, 661-77 (1995) (arguing that active financial
management imposes dead weight economic loss on the economy). Yet Professor Stout's ar-
gument in relation to the OTC derivative markets is unsatisfying because it offers no means of
distinguishing pure disagreement-based dealing from risk-shifting or arbitrage activity dealing.
Consequently, Professor Stout shies away from an explicit call for aggressive regulation, instead
proposing a legal regime where OTC derivative contracts would be unenforceable but where
counterparties would not exposed to criminal or civil penalties. See Stout, supra note 183, at
782-83. According to Professor Stout, such a regime would function as a proxy discouraging
pure disagreement-based trades while not inhibiting salutary market activity. See id. Professor
Stout's inability to directly distinguish pure disagreement-based trades from other types of
trades in the OTC derivative markets suggests that the volume of pure disagreement-based
trades is quite small.
Judge Posner reasons that the liberty to speculate provides positive welfare benefit in that
speculators play a critical role in mitigating the effects of information failure on asset prices.
See RICHARD A. POSNER, EcONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 140 (5th ed. 1998) ("[S]peculation ...
, by giving people ... a stake in forecasting prices correctly even though they are not involved
in producing or consuming the commodity traded in the market, increases the amount of price
information in the market."). "[S]peculation," he writes, "serves the salutary purpose of ena-
bling the rapid adjustment of prices to current values. The speculator is an eager searcher for
undervalued and overvalued [investments]. The information that he uncovers diffuses rapidly
throughout the market .... enabling other traders to adjust swiftly to the changed conditions
that he has discovered." Id. at 487. In a market populated by sophisticated actors, trading moti-
vated by factors other than risk-shifting likely results from traders looking to take advantage of
subtle information asymmetries that result from proprietary modeling or differences in institu-
tional experience.
185 See Gibson, supra note 167, at 413-15 (maintaining that policy makers should follow a
market participant-based rule).
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commodities.186 Finally, sophisticated swap counterparties possess
the understanding and the wherewithal to obtain pertinent financial
information in the negotiation process and to protect themselves ade-
quately in contract from deceptive practices.
2. Analysis Under the Sotomayor Alternative
While Judge Sotomayor's approach would not have subjected all
OTC swap transactions to the Act, it would have perpetuated legal
uncertainty in the OTC swap market. Sotomayor's approach did not
extend the Act's jurisdiction to any executory contract that contem-
plated delivery, involved a substantial commercial risk of delivery, or
effected a hedging strategy. Thus, interest rate swap transactions ef-
fected for hedging purposes would be beyond the Act's reach. The
approach would have perpetuated legal uncertainty in the OTC swap
market, however, by subjecting swaps effected for arbitrage or risk-
amplifying purposes to the Act's jurisdiction. While Judge Soto-
mayor's willingness to make a real effort to analyze the economic
purpose was laudable, her approach advanced a rather dubious an-
tipathy toward risk-amplifying transactions. Moreover, Judge Soto-
mayor's approach offered little guidance in distinguishing risk-
amplifying transactions from hedges beyond an admonition that ex-
empt transactions be executed primarily for hedging purposes. In
practice, many swap participants only partially hedge, simultaneously
taking a position on a view. Others use swaps to amplify their expo-
sure to interest rates, hoping to make use of superior information to
reduce the cost of debt. Thus the Sotomayor approach would poten-
tially have subjected a significant proportion of OTC swap market
activity to the Act's jurisdiction, rather than securing legal certainty in
the OTC markets.
3. Analysis Under the Easterbrook Approach
The Easterbrook approach offered the best alternative to mitigate
legal risk in the OTC swap market. Judge Easterbrook proposed that
"contract for future delivery" entails only contracts having institu-
tional characteristics similar to exchange-traded futures contracts.
The fact that such an interpretation is consistent with the Commission
regulatory capacity suggests that Judge Easterbrook's interpretation is
sound. OTC swaps, including standardized vanilla transactions, are
easily distinguished from exchange-traded futures. Whereas futures
exchanges do not allow negotiation of terms except for price, OTC
's6 See id. at 411 (arguing that the purpose of the Act is to prevent manipulation of the
commodities markets and reasoning that since most of the commodities that underlay OTC
derivatives transactions are abundant, potential market manipulation is not a problem and, thus,
the Commission has little justification in regulating OTC derivatives markets).
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swap participants may freely negotiate variations to terms contained
in the paradigmatic ISDA master agreements. 81 OTC swaps, unlike
exchange-traded futures, are not periodically marked-to-market. 88
This difference manifests itself economically as convexity bias.
89
Finally, OTC swap participants generally do not execute swaps
through clearinghouse institutions.190  Accordingly, interpreting
"contract for future delivery" technically would have precluded appli-
cation of the Act's jurisdiction to OTC swaps.
C. Administrative Attempts to Deal with the Act's Jurisdictional
Ambiguity
1. The Commission's 1989 Safe Harbor Statement
Commission regulators first recognized the OTC swap market in
1987 by announcing that the Act's jurisdiction extended to most swap
transactions.' 9' Despite its assertion on the jurisdictional scope of the
Act, the Commission took a passive no-action attitude toward OTC
swap activity, even suggesting that Congress codify its approach.
92
The Commission's passive-aggressive tact provoked harsh reaction
from market participants and other financial regulators193 because the
assertion implied that OTC swap transactions violated the exchange-
trading requirement of the Commission and, thus, were unenforce-
able. 1-4 On the other hand, a few commentators supported the Com-
mission's aggressive jurisdiction claim but complained that the
Commission had no authority to take a no-action position. 95
187 See supra Part LB.2.a.
18' See supra Part LB.2.b.
189 See id.
'90 See supra Part LB.3.
191 See Regulation of Hybrid and Related Instruments, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,023 (1987) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 34) (noting that with the exception of three types of hybrid transactions,
most swap transactions are subject to the Act).
'92 See id.
193 See CFTC to Vote on Publishing Revised Rules for Hybrid Products, SEC. WK., Dec.
12, 1988, at 6 (reporting accusations of Commission overreaching).
194 See CFTC Urged to Scrap Ban on 'Hybrids', L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1988, at 22 ("[The
Commission's proposal] has ... generated uncertainty among market participants with respect
to a wide variety of transactions, including interest rate swaps.") (quoting George Gould, former
Undersecretary for Finance, Department of Treasury). The Treasury Department sent the
Commission a letter in April 1988 stating that "the proposal concerning off-exchange instru-
ments ha[d] created 'legal uncertainties that may cause serious problems in the swap markets
and other large institutional markets."' Id.
195 See, e.g., Stein, supra note 92, at 503. At the time, the Act did not explicitly afford the
Commission exemptive authority. Professor Stein, believing that that swaps constituted "off-
exchange futures" and that the anti-speculation policy of the Act provided normative grounds
for Commission regulation of the OTC swap market, argued that the Commission should not
"ignore its congressional grant of jurisdiction and concomitant obligation to prohibit off-
exchange futures" simply because "the advantages of off-exchange futures trading outweigh its
disadvantages." Id.; see also Young & Stein, supra note 53, at 1919 n.14 ("The CFTC lacks
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The Commission's explicit jurisdictional assertion did not last.
Two years after its initial assertion, the Commission backed off,
opining that most swap transactions are not "appropriately regulated"
under the Act since "swaps generally have characteristics, such as
individually tailored terms, predominantly commercial and institu-
tional participants, and expectation of being held to maturity, rather
than offset during the term of the agreement, that may warrant distin-
guishing them from futures contracts.', 196 The Commission followed-
up by crafting a safe harbor for swap transactions "consistent with
policies reflected in the Act's jurisdictional exclusion for forward
contracts'' 197 to mitigate the market insecurity wrought by the 1987
jurisdictional statement.198 To qualify for safe harbor, swaps had to
be bilaterally negotiated 99 agreements that did not contain an ex-
change-style right of offset.2°° Moreover, qualifying swaps could not
be executed through a clearinghouse or provide for a marking-to-
market mechanism. 201 Finally, qualifying swaps had to be related to
the line of business of the transacting counterparties202 and could not
be marketed to the public.
20 3
Notwithstanding the safe harbor policy, uncertainty remained.
The Commission's justification for the safe harbor policy appeared to
authority to permit off-exchange futures trading without an express mandate from Congress.")
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
196 Policy Statement Concerning Swap Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,694,30,695 (1989).
197 id.
198 See Deborah Hargreaves, CFTC Launches Rules for Off-Exchange Market, FIN. TIMES,
July 18, 1989, at 28 ("The agency [attempted to tread] a delicate path in its approach to...
swaps since it want[ed] to protect investors from fraudulent practices while at the same time
providing no obstruction to market innovation.").
199 See Policy Statement Concerning Swap Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. at 30,696 ('To
qualify for safe harbor treatment, swaps [had to] be negotiated by the parties as to their material
terms, based upon individualized credit determinations, and documented by the parties in an
agreement or series of agreements that is not fully standardized.").
20 See id. ('To qualify for safe harbor treatment, the swap [had to] create obligations that
[were] terminable, absent default, only with the consent of the counterparty. If consent to ter-
mination is given at the outset of the agreement and a termination formula or price fixed, the
consent provision [had to] be privately negotiated.").
201 See UL ("[S]afe harbor [was] applicable only to swap transactions that are not supported
by the credit of a clearing organization and that [were] not primarily or routinely supported by a
market-to-market margin and variation settlement system designed to eliminate individualized
credit risk.").
M See id at 30,697 ("[S]afe harbor [was] limited to swap transactions undertaken in con-
junction with the parties' line of business. This restriction [was] intended to preclude public
participation in qualifying swap transactions and to limit qualifying transactions to those based
upon individualized credit determinations."); see also id. at 30,697 n.23 ("Swap transactions
entered into with respect to exchange rate, interest rate, or other price exposure arising from a
participant's line of business or the financing of its business [were] consistent with this stan-
dard.").
203 See id. ('This restriction reflect[ed] the institutional and commercial nature of the ex-
isting swap market and the Commission's intention to restrict qualifying swap transactions to
those undertaken as an adjunct of the participant's line of business.").
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clash with logic of the dominant traditional model.204 Recognizing
this, the Commission attempted to reconcile the inconsistency with
the argument that the safe harbor policy embodied the spirit of the
Act notwithstanding its appearance. 2 5 However, the argument did
little to reassure market participants. Moreover, the Commission had
no explicit exemptive power under the Act. Thus, while the Commis-
sion may have been willing to refrain from regulating OTC swaps,
swap market participants were wary of the risk that swap contracts
might be held unenforceable in private suits.
206
2. The Futures Trading Act of 1992 and the 1993 Safe Harbor
Exemption
Congress addressed the issue with its enactment of the Futures
Trading Practices Act of 1992 ("FrPA"). 2 7  Purportedly acting to
"promote responsible economic or financial innovation and fair com-
petition, ' '2°8 Congress begged the fundamental question of jurisdic-
tional scope. Instead of explicitly defining the jurisdictional scope of
the Act, it passed the buck to the Commission by granting it discre-
tionary authority to exempt certain tra'nsactions from specific Act
209provisions.
The FTPA granted the Commission limited exemptive power.
First, it allowed the Commission to exempt swap transactions that
were "not part of a fungible class of agreements that are standardized
as to their material economic terms, to the extent that such agree-
ments may be regarded as subject to the provisions of this chapter."'210
Second, the Commission had to impose a statutorily defined suitabil-
ity requirement.2 1  Third, exemptions had to meet a public-purposes
2o4 See Harris, supra note 80, at 1127 (arguing that the delivery requirement" put the
Commission "on a clear collision course" with the OTC derivatives market).
205 See Policy Statement Concerning Swap Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. at 30,695 ("Al-
though [the] jurisdictional and exemptive or exclusionary provisions [of the Act] are not suffi-
ciently broad to provide clear exemptive boundaries for many swaps, [those provisions] reflect
policies relevant to the safe harbor policy ... and may encompass certain swap transactions.").
2 Prior to the enactment of the Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, 7 U.S.C. § 6
(2000), the Act "neither contemplated off-exchange futures nor provided the Commission with
exemptive rulemaking powers to allow commercial parties to engage in futures [trading] off-
exchange." Barry W. Taylor, Swaps: Commodities Laws in Transition, in ADVANCED SWAPS
AND DERIVATIVE FINANCIAL PRODUCTS 45, 46 (Daniel P. Cunningham ed., 1991). Taylor
reasons that "[w]ithout exemptive rulemaking powers for futures, the CFTC [was] unable to
remove the risk under federal law that courts could void swaps as illegal off-exchange futures."
id. at 46.
"7 7 U.S.C. § 6.
20' Id. § 6(c)(1).
2 See id.
210 See id. § 6(c)(5)(B). The language of this provision reflects Congress's unwillingness
to consider the fundamental jurisdictional question.
211 See id. § 6(c)(2)(B)(i) (providing that the Commission may only exempt swaps transac-
tions between "appropriate persons as defined in 7 U.S.C. § 6(c)(3)").
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test.2 12  Finally, the Commission could not grant exemptions that
would materially affect "the ability of the Commission or any con-
tract market to discharge its regulatory or self-regulatory duties under
[the Act]. 213
Pursuant to the FTPA, the Commission in 1993 issued a safe
harbor exemption that shielded many swap transactions from certain
provisions of the Act.214  However, to qualify for safe harbor, the
swap transaction had to meet certain criteria. First, the swap had to
be a non-standardized transaction215 between "eligible swap partici-
pants. 21 6  Moreover, it could not be executed through a clearing-
house,17 and credit risk had to be a material part of counterparty de-
liberations.218 Unlike the 1989 safe harbor statement, however, the
1993 safe harbor policy allowed the exempted swap agreements to
include certain netting arrangements aimed at mitigating counterparty
credit risk219 or other arrangements aimed at mitigating systemic
risk.2
20
3. Revised Part 35: The Proposed 2000 Safe Harbor Framework
While the swap market has enjoyed fantastic growth since codi-
fication of the 1993 safe harbor policy, legal risk continued to lurk.
The problematic feature of the 1993 safe harbor policy was that, in
restricting safe harbor treatment to non-standardized swap transac-
tions 21 where credit risk was a material aspect of the negotiations,
222
212 See id. § 6(c)(2)(A) (providing that any administrative exemption must be "consistent
with the public interest and the purposes of [the Act]").
"' Id. § 6(c)(2)(B)(ii).
214 See 17 C.F.R. pt. 35 (2000).
21' See id. § 35.2(b) (requiring that the swap not be "part of a fungible class of agreements
that are standardized as to their material economic terms").
216 Id. § 35.2(a).
217 See id. § 35.2(d) (requiring that the "swap agreement is not entered into and traded on
or through a multilateral transaction execution facility"). See also Exemption for Certain Swap
Agreements, 58 Fed. Reg. 5587, 5591 (1993) ("TIhe exemption does not extend to transactions
that are subject to a clearing system where the credit risk of individual niembers ... is effec-
tively eliminated and replaced by a system of mutualized risk of loss that binds members gener-
ally whether or not they are counterparties to the original transaction.").
211 See § 35.2(c) (requiring that the "creditworthiness of any party having an actual or
potential obligation under the swap agreement would be a material consideration in entering into
or determining the terms of the swap agreement, including pricing, cost, or credit enhancement
terms of the swap agreement").
219 See Exemption for Certain Swap Agreements, 58 Fed. Reg. at 5591 ("Under the [re-
vised] proviso, bilateral arrangements for the netting of obligations to make payments or trans-
fers of property ... would be permitted. Multiparty netting arrangements would also be per-
mitted, provided that the underlying gross obligations among the parties are not extinguished
until all netted obligations are fully performed.").
22 See id. ("By expanding the ability of swap participants to utilize collateral and margin
arrangements beyond that which is explicitly permitted under the Policy Statement, these rules
should promote arrangements that will reduce risk within the financial system.").
2' See 17 C.F.R. § 35.2(b) (requiring that the swap not be "part of a fungible class of
agreements that are standardized as to their material economic terms").
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the policy embodied the structural ambiguity of statutory "contract for
future delivery" framework. Market sensitivity to such risk height-
ened following the Commission's aborted effort to assert itself as an
active regulator of the OTC swap market. In response to market skit-
tishness, the President's Working Group on Financial Markets, com-
posed of the four federal financial regulators, unanimously recom-
mended that Congress amend the Act to explicitly exclude bilateral
transactions between sophisticated parties involving non-finite finan-
cial commodities.223 Congress enacted the recommendation as part of
the Modernization Act. Prior to enactment of the Modernization Act,
the Commission had promulgated a "new regulatory framework" that
mirrored the President's Working Group's recommendation. 2 4 Un-
der the now-obsolete framework, the Commission generally extended
safe harbor to all contracts, agreements, and transactions meeting
certain conditions.2 5 According to the Commission, a majority of the
comments on the new framework "expressed the view that the [new
framework] . . . would increase legal certainty for the OTC mar-
ket. 2 26 Yet legal risk under the framework would have been consid-
erable.
a. Revised Part 35 Would Have Inadequately Mitigated Legal Risk in
the OTC Swap Market
1. Safe Harbor Limitations in Revised Part 35. The Commis-
sion's abolishment of the non-standardization condition of the old
regime would have been the critical innovation of revised Part 35.27
222 See id. § 35.2(c) (requiring that the "creditworthiness of any party having an actual or
potential obligation under the swap agreement would be a material consideration in entering into
or determining the terms of the swap agreement, including pricing, cost, or credit enhancement
terms of the swap agreement").
223 See The President's Working Group on Financial Markets Report on Over-the-Counter
Derivatives Markets and the Commodity Exchange Act: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Risk
Management, Research, and Specialty Crops of the Comm. on Agriculture, 106th Cong. 17
(2000) ("Bilateral swap agreements... entered into by eligible swap participants... should be
excluded from [the Act].... The exclusion should not extend to any swap agreement that in-
volves a non-financial commodity with a finite supply.").
224 See A New Regulatory Framework for Multilateral Transaction Execution Facilities,
Intermediaries and Clearing Organizations; Rules Relating to Intermediaries of Commodity
Interest Transactions; A New Regulatory Framework for Clearing Organizations; Exemption for
Bilateral Transactions, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,272, 82,273 (2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 35).
225 See id. at 78,035.
226 Id. at78,031.
227 See id. at 78,035. The Commission complemented revised Part 35 with revised Part 36,
which would have provided for the legal execution of swap transactions on "multilateral trans-
action execution facilities." See A New Regulatory Framework for Multilateral Transaction
Execution Facilities, Intermediaries and Clearing Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. at 77,967 (defin-
ing multilateral transaction execution facilities as "electronic or non-electronic market[s] or
similar facilit[ies] through which persons.. . enter into, agree to enter into or execute binding
transactions by accepting bids or offers made by one person that are open to multiple persons
conducting business through such market or facility") (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
INTEREST RATE SWAPS
The problem was that the Commission might have exceeded its
statutory exemptive discretion in promulgating it. The Act granted
the Commission discretion to exempt only swap agreements "not part
of a fungible class of agreements that are standardized as to their ma-
terial economic terms, to the extent that such agreements may be re-
garded as subject to the provisions of [the Act]." Since revised Part
35 would have exempted those interest rate swaps "standardized as to
their material economic terms," one might have argued that extending
safe harbor treatment to them was improper. To this, one might have
countered that standardization meant the enforced standardization
characteristic of futures exchanges. The issue would likely have been
a source of uncertainty among OTC swap participants.
Moreover, revised Part 35 contained the statutorily required con-
dition that the exemption apply only to transactions involving eligible
participants.229 As a proxy for suitability, eligible participants in-
cluded certain business entities, ERISA benefit plans, and natural per-
sons meeting an explicitly defined financial suitability threshold, cer-
tain financial institutions, governmental entities, certain broker-
dealers subject to the Exchange Act of 1934, and certain commodity
merchants, brokers, and traders.230 Some commentators criticized the
suitability proxy as too restrictive in that a number of willing swap
market participants did not qualify under the suitability require-
ment.
231
Finally, revised Part 35 limited safe harbor to interest rate swaps
cleared through authorized clearing organizations.232 The Commis-
sion defined clearing organizations as organizations that act as a
"universal counterparty" to provide "a credit enhancement function..
in connection with netting and/or settling of the payments and pay-,, 133
ment obligations" of swap participants. Such an organization
would have been authorized when 1) recognized by the Commission
as an authorized clearing organization, 2) subject to SEC regulation,
3) subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Reserve or the Comptrol-
ler of the Currency or 4) subject to similar oversight in a foreign ju-
risdiction, if it also "abided] by appropriate and adequate informa-
tion-sharing arrangements."
M 7 U.S.C. § 6(c)(5)(B) (2000).
229 See Exemption for Bilateral Transactions, 65 Fed. Reg. 78,030, 78,034-35 (2000) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 35).
m3 See id.
231 See id. at 78,033 n.23 (responding to commentary that "some of the financial thresholds
... are too restrictive").
232 See id. at 78,035.
23 A New Regulatory Framework for Clearing Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 78,020, 78,026
(2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 39).
2U id.
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2. Revised Part 35 Did Not Exempt Swap Transactions from the
Anti-Deception Provisions of the Act. Like the old Part 35 regime,
revised Part 35 would not have shielded interest rate swaps from the
anti-deception provisions of the Act.235 Accordingly, the Commission
would have had authority to police transactions that fell under the
Act's jurisdiction for deceptive behavior, notwithstanding the admin-
istrative exemption. Consider the now-infamous swap deals between
Gibson Greetings and Bankers Trust "'BT"). In 1994, Gibson sued
BT after suffering a $23 million loss2 36 in a series of exotic interest
rate swap transactions.237 The swaps were exotic in that the swap
cash flows "varied according to a complex formula that made them
hypersensitive to rising rates. 238 Gibson alleged that BT's agents
deliberately misrepresented the nature of the swap cash flows. 2 39 The
allegation triggered investigations by the SEC, the Federal Reserve,
and the Commission.2
40
The Commission based its action on the theory that BT acted
as Gibson's advisor for the transaction.241  According to the Com-
mission, BT's advisory position rendered it a "commodity trading
advisor" under the Act. Hence, the Commission argued that it had
the authority to police BT's allegedly fraudulent misrepresenta-
tions.2 42 The Act defines "commodity trading advisor" as anyone
who, "for compensation or profit, engages in the business of ad-
vising others ... as to ... the advisability of trading in any con-
23' See 17 C.F.R. § 35.3(a) (2000); see also Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co.,
925 F. Supp. 1270, 1285-86 (S.D. Ohio 1996) ("[E]ven if... swaps are exempt from other
provisions of the Act, they may be subject to the anti-fraud provisions.").
26 See John Connor & G. Bruce Knecht, Bankers Trust Facing Action on Derivatives,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 1994, at A3.
237 See generally Paulette Thomas, Procter & Gamble Sues Bankers Trust Because of
Huge Losses on Derivatives, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 1994, at A6.
238 Jeffrey Taylor, Bankers Trust Faces Inquiry on Derivatives Sales, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1,
1994, at Cl. See also BT Securities Corporation, CFTC Docket No. 95-3, 1994 CFrC LEXIS
340, at *4 (Dec. 22, 1994) ("Many [of the transactions involved] had leverage factors which
caused Gibson's losses to increase dramatically with relatively small changes in interest rates.").
239 See Taylor, supra note 238, at Cl. The derivatives in question were customized con-
tracts. The Commission found that Gibson relied on the information provided to it by BT be-
cause Gibson did not possess the "expertise or computer models needed to value the derivatives
it purchased from [BT]." BTSecurities, 1994 CFTC LEXIS 340, at *5. The Commission con-
cluded that BT's "representatives misled Gibson about the value of the company's derivatives
positions .... [Thus] Gibson ... continued to purchase derivatives from BT Securities. In
addition, the valuations provided by BT Securities' representatives caused Gibson to make
material understatements of the company's unrealized losses . I..." d. at *7.
240 See Taylor, supra note 238, at Cl.
241 The Commission concluded that BT had "acknowledged that they had entered into an
advisory relationship with Gibson which, under the facts and circumstances of this case, [was]
sufficient to cause [BT] to have become a commodity trading advisor with respect to its deriva-
tives transactions with Gibson." BTSecurities, 1994 CFTC LEXIS 340, at *15-16.
242 Cf 7 U.S.C. § 6o(1)(B) (2000) (prohibiting commodity trading advisors from "en-




tract of sale of a commodity... subject to the rules of a contract
market."243 Thus, the enforcement action necessarily implied that
the Act's jurisdiction extends to at least one of the swap transac-
tions between Gibson and BT.244 When critics charged that the
Commission did not have jurisdiction over the transactions in
question, the Commission deffly begged the question.245
3. The Commission Had Discretion to Revise or Repeal the
Safe Harbor. The final, and perhaps the most important basis, for
legal risk under the revised Part 35 regulatory framework was that the
framework existed at the discretion of the Commission.246 At some
point, the Commission might have exercised its discretion to fashion a
more interventionist regulatory framework. In 1998, the Commis-
sion, under the leadership of Broksee Born, a proponent of aggressive
regulation of the OTC derivative markets, announced a reexamination
of the Commission's hands-off regulatory approach vis-h-vis OTC
derivative markets. 247 Many observers interpreted the Commission's
1998 "concept release" as a tacit projection of Commission regulatory
authority over the OTC derivative markets and vehemently pro-
tested.24 Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, Federal Reserve Chair-
243 Id. § la(5)(A)(i)(1) (emphasis added); see FDIC v. Hildenbrand, 892 F. Supp. 1317,
1324-25 (D. Colo. 1995) (interpreting commodity trading advisor as a person "'in the business
of advising others' on the value or advisability of trading in the purchase or sale of futures con-
tracts or options").
244 See Harris, supra note 80, at 1144-45; see also John C. Coffee Jr., Competition Versus
Consolidation: The Significance of Organizational Structure in Financial and Securities Regu-
lation, 50 Bus. LAW. 447,448 (1995) ("Although the CFrC's opinion was diplomatically vague
on this score, its conclusion that BT was a 'commodities trading advisor' implied that swaps
were sometimes either futures contracts or commodities options. Even if thinly veiled, this
analysis meant the CFrC was contending that it had jurisdiction .... ").
245 See Tim W. Ferguson, Business World: Commodities Boss Forswears Future in Swaps,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 1995, at A9. Ferguson argues that the enforcement action amounted to an
illegitimate power grab since the Act's jurisdiction did not extend to interest rate swaps. In
response, Commission Chairwoman Mary Shapiro begged the essential question: "You were fed
a bill of goods. We did not say that swaps are futures ... or use a statutory provision that says
that swaps are futures." Id. Rather, the Commission based its jurisdiction on "taped evidence
indicating intent to deceive a client." Id.
m See, e.g., Rob Garver, Capital Briefs: Swaps Measure Delayed as Agencies Argue, AM.
BANKER, May 12, 2000, at 2 (reporting that "[b]ankers and others who engage in swaps trading
are concerned that future CFITC chairmen could require that these products be traded on a public
exchange overseen by the federal government").
247 Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 63 Fed. Reg. 26,114, 26,115 (1998) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 34, 35) Che Commission has been engaged in a comprehensive regulatory reform
effort designed to update the agency's oversight of both on exchange and off-exchange markets.
As part of this process, the Commission believes that it is appropriate to reexamine its regula-
tory approach to the OTC derivatives market .... ").
248 See Concept Release Concerning Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 64 Fed. Reg. 65,669
(1999) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 34, 35) ("The [concept release] has been widely per-
ceived, both within the derivatives industry and among other financial regulators, as indicating
an intent to expand the Commission's regulatory reach with respect to OTC derivatives."). The
reaction was not overblown. Chairwoman Born believed her efforts to extend the Commis-
sion's regulatory reach to the OTC derivative markets to be a matter of "principle." See Mi-
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man Alan Greenspan, and SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt challenged
the Commission's zeal on both legal and policy grounds.249 Chairman
Greenspan went so far as to assert that Commission regulation of any
financial derivative transaction between sophisticated actors serves no
legitimate purpose and is socially inefficient.250 Despite Chairwoman
Born's tenacious defense of the Commission's position,251 opponents
eventually forced the agency into submission, and its concept release
was formally withdrawn. 2
The Commission's pro-market stance after the 1998 concept re-
lease debacle was a consequence of a high-stakes political scrum
between the Commission and an array of opponents that included
other financial regulators and market participants. Before enactment
of the statutory exemption, the specter of aggressive Commission
regulation might have again arisen from its tomb. Though unlikely
under the Bush administration, interventionist zeal might again take
hold of the public policy conscience. In such a climate, 3 the Com-
chael Schroeder, Born, Again: CFTC Chief Refuses to Take Back Seat in the Derivatives De-
bate, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 1998, at Al.
249 See Dominic Bencivenga, Revisiting Derivatives: CFTC Proposal Sparks Regulatory
Turf Battle, N.Y.L.J., June 4, 1998, at 5 (reporting that the joint statement expressed doubt that
the Commission's jurisdiction extended to the OTC swap markets).
2-o See Over-the-Counter Derivatives: Hearing before the Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition
and Forestry of the U.S. Senate, 105th Cong. 50 (1998) (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chair-
man, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System). After arguing that the Act exists merely to
prevent manipulation of commodity prices, Chairman Greenspan concluded:
[T]he [Federal Reserve Board] questions whether the [Act] as currently imple-
mented is an appropriate framework for professional trading of financial futures on
exchanges. The key elements of the [Act] were put into place in the 1920's and
1930's to regulate the trading of agricultural futures by the general public. The vast
majority of financial futures traded simply are not as susceptible to manipulation as
agricultural and other commodity futures where supplies are more limited... [and]
simply do not require the consumer protections that may be needed by the general
public. Regulation that serves no useful purpose hinders the efficiency of markets to
enlarge standards of living.
Id.
2' See Michael Schroeder, Commodities: CFTC Chairwoman Won't Halt Study of OTC
Derivatives Rules, WALL ST. J., June 11, 1998, at Cl. ("[Chairwoman Born] told Congress...
that she has no intention of halting a study to consider new regulations for the multitrillion-
dollar over-the-counter derivatives market. In dismissing widespread criticism, Ms. Born
bluntly testified that complaints 'reflect[ed] a lack of understanding ... and a desire to avoid
government oversight."') (third alteration in original).
252 See, e.g., Anason, supra note 156, at 2.
253 One of the lessons the New Deal teaches is that the proponent of regulation loves finan-
cial malaise because nothing causes the political winds to shift in his favor more than such dis-
tress. The near collapse of Long Term Capital Management ("LTCM"), which had an ex-
tremely large and heavily leveraged exposure to various derivatives, posed enough of a threat to
the financial system to motivate the Federal Reserve to engineer a bailout financed by leading
U.S. financial institutions. The event re-energized Chairwoman Born's flagging campaign to
establish a regulatory beachhead in OTC derivative markets. She took the event as a vindication
of her position and circulated a pamphlet among key congressional leaders warning that the
situation underscored the need for an aggressive Commission presence in those markets. See
Schroeder, supra note 251, at Al. Ultimately, however, influential members of Congress came
to blame the collapse of LTCM on lax lending practices rather than on inadequate regulation.
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mission, with an aggressive interventionist at the helm, might have
lifted the discretionary swap exemption, possibly exposing the OTC
swap market to the ravages of the exchange-trading requirement.
III. STATUTORY SOLUTION TO JURISDICTIONAL AMBIGUITY: THE
MODERNIZATION ACT
A. The Modernization Act's Exemptions
Ultimately, the attempt to mitigate legal risks for swap partici-
pants through regulatory means proved unsuccessful. In late 1999,
the President's Commission on Financial Markets recommended that
Congress statutoril exempt most derivative transactions from the
Act's jurisdiction. About a year later, Congress enacted the rec-
ommendation. 255 The Modernization Act exempts "agreement[s],
contract[s] or transaction[s]" in "excluded commodit[ies]" between
"eligible contract participants" not executed on trading facilities from
most provisions of the Act, including the anti-deception provisions5
6
"Excluded commodity" essentially means any stochastic variable as-
sociated with a non-finite process that has a financial, commercial, or
economic consequence. 5 7  "Eligible contract participants" functions
as a suitability proxy intended to limit the exception to transactions
involving sophisticated parties.258 For such transactions executed on
electronic trading facilities, the Modernization Act limits exemption
to negotiated transactions for the account of the transactors, as distin-
guished from the exchange-enforced standardized futures. 259 Elec-
tronic trading facilities should not be confused with the exempt fu-
tures exchanges provided for in the Modernization Act. While the
Modernization Act shields exempt futures markets from most provi-
sions of the Act, it explicitly exposes transactions executed through
exempt futures exchanges to the anti-deception provisions of the
Act. 260 Exempt principal-to-principal derivative transactions executed
on trading facilities do not present such exposure.
261
See CFTC Moratorium Vote Signals Lending Is First Concern in LTCM Collapse, SEC. WK.,
Oct. 5, 1998, at I (reporting Congress's general inclination to attribute the LTCM collapse to
"sloppy lending practices" rather than "inadequate derivatives regulations").
2 See The President's Working Group on Financial Markets Report on Over-the-Counter
Derivatives Markets and the Commodity Exchange Act: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Risk
Management, Research, and Specialty Crops of the Comm. on Agriculture, 106th Cong. 22
(2000).
25 See Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat.
2763 (2000).
21 Id § 103.
217 See id. § 101.
25s See id.
29 See id § 103.
20 See id § 114.
21 See id. § 104.
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Most interest rate swaps, whether or not executed through trad-
ing facilities, fit neatly within the derivatives exemption. Interest rates
explicitly qualify as an excluded commodity.262 Moreover, the credit
intensive nature of interest rate swaps limits their use, for the most
part, to firms that meet the qualifications for eligible contract partici-
pants.263 Finally, interest rates swaps are negotiated transactions that
meet the "principal-to-principal" condition of the exemption for de-
rivative transactions effected through a trading facility.2  In addition
to the derivatives exception, the Modernization Act contains a sepa-
rate exclusion for swap transactions. The swap exclusion applies to
any negotiated "agreement, contract or transaction" between "eligible
contract participants" that is not executed on a trading facility and
does not involve an agricultural commodity.265 While the swap ex-
clusion is surplusage for swaps on excluded commodities such as in-
terest rates, it provides the cover for qualifying swap deals involving
non-agricultural, non-excluded commodities such as oil or metals.
B. Lingering Legal Risk
While the exemption is sweeping, it is not an absolute shield
from legal risk for interest rate swap participants. The Modernization
Act exempts qualifying derivative transactions from the exchange-
trading requirement and the anti-deception provisions of the Act.
Moreover, no derivative participant may sue to rescind a derivative
agreement between "eligible contract participants or persons reasona-
bly believed to be eligible contract participants.",265 However, the
suitability limitation presents legal risk for persons, natural or other-
wise, ready and able to participate in swap transactions who fall to
qualify as an "eligible contract participant." The requirement is an
imperfect proxy for suitability that will leave suitable transactions
exposed to the Act's jurisdiction. Congress tried to provide for this
problem by granting the Commission authority to extend the scope of
"eligible contract participant" to "any other person that the Commis-
sion determines to be eligible in light of the financial or other qualifi-
cations of the person.' 267 However, a number of organizations com-
plained about the restrictive nature of a similar suitability approach
adopted by the Commission as part of the Part 35 revision but which
was aborted with enactment of the Modernization Act.
268
262 See id. § 101.
263 See id.
264 See id. § 103.
265 See supra Part I.A.1.
266 Commodity Futures Modernization Act § 120.
267 Id. § 101.
m See A New Regulatory Framework for Multilateral Transaction Execution Facilities,
Intermediaries and Clearing Organizations; Rules Relating to Intermediaries of Commodity
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An interesting question involves the status of interest rate swap
transactions between non-eligible yet financially suitable persons.
Would such transactions fall within the Act's jurisdiction? Ulti-
mately, this question turns on the contract for future delivery analyt-
ics. 269 However, the enactment of the Modernization Act adds new
twists to the analysis that might make it difficult for regulators and
courts to conclude that interest rate swaps involving ineligible partici-
pants nevertheless fall beyond the Act's jurisdiction on the basis that
such transactions do not constitute contracts for future delivery.
At the suggestion of the President's Commission Report, Con-
gress explicitly limited the derivative transactions exemption to deals
in exempt commodities between eligible participants. Moreover, the
Modernization Act, in its definition of eligible participants, gives the
Commission plenary authority to expand the scope of the term. Thus,
one might conclude that Congress intended the Act's jurisdiction to
reach similar transactions between ineligible participants. This con-
clusion is buttressed by the fact that the Modernization Act charges
the four federal financial regulators to "conduct a study of issues in-
volving the offering of swap agreements to persons other than eligible
contract participants" for the purpose of, among other things, recom-
mending an "appropriate regulatory structure to address consumer
protection." 270 The regulatory flexibility as to the definition of eligi-
ble contract participants and the charge to study the effects of ex-
panding the scope of the exemption probably means that Congress
intended otherwise exempt transactions involving non-qualified per-
sons to be covered by the Act. However, the Modernization Act says
nothing that would clarify the meaning of "contract for future deliv-
ery." In fact, the Modernization Act explicitly precludes a presump-
tion that contracts not qualifying for the Modernization Act's exemp-
tion fall under the Act's jurisdiction.27' Nevertheless, while Judge
Easterbrook provides a sound basis for interpreting "contract for fu-
ture delivery" to exclude negotiated interest rate swaps from the Act's
jurisdiction, 272 a counselor would live dangerously by relying on such
a theory as a basis for advising a non-qualified client to participate in
the OTC swap market.
As for exempt interest rate swap transactions, the Modernization
Act explicitly leaves such transactions exposed to all state laws ex-
cept state or local anti-gambling or anti-bucket shop laws.273 While a
rigorous analysis of state-based legal risk for swap transactions is be-
Interest Transactions; A New Regulatory Framework for Clearing Organizations; Exemption for
Bilateral Transactions, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,272, 82,273 (2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 35).
269 See supra Part II.
210 § 105.
2' See id. § 107.
27 See supra Part II.A.3.
27 See §§ 12(d), 16(d), 103, 117.
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yond the scope of this Comment, the following anecdote demon-
strates that such risk is not trivial. Consider the case of the 5/30-
interest rate swap between Bankers Trust and Procter & Gamble dis-
cussed above. After losing over $100 million on the 5/30-interest rate
swap, P&G sued to avoid its losses. P&G claimed, essentially, that
BT had misled it about the interest rate risk presented by the convo-
luted swap payoff formula.274 The following statement by Edwin
Artzt, CEO of P&G, captured the crux of P&G's theory supporting
rescission: "There is a notion that end users of derivatives must be
held accountable for what they buy. We agree completely, but only if
the terms and risks are fully and accurately disclosed., 275 P&G but-
tressed its position by suggesting fraud, maintaining that BT repre-
sentatives, responding to P&G's requests for a sensitivity analysis of
the swap payouts under various interest rate circumstances, said that
"possible changes in rates or volatilities would not have a significant
effect on P&G's position.., and that it was not worth providing to
P&G any new sensitivity analysis.,,276 BT retorted that P&G's loss
"was the result of market risks that the company knowingly took
through a transaction that it understood and fully approved,",217 noting
that a senior P&G official approved the deal. BT chairman Charles
Sanford announced at BT's annual meeting that the bank had no ethi-
cal obligation to P&G and expressed confidence about BT's prospects
in litigation. P&G sought a declaratory judgement in federal court
that it owed BT nothing under the swap. Moreover, P&G sought pu-
nitive damages, attorney fees, and other costs.
Mr. Stanford's confidence was almost vindicated. A federal
court rejected most of P&G's claims, including all federal claims.2 78
However, the court sent a couple of state-law issues to trial. The
court concluded that BT had a duty under New York law to disclose
to P&G material information "both before the parties entered into the
swap transactions and... during their performance. 279 Moreover,
the court concluded that BT had a duty under New York law "to deal
fairly and in good faith during the performance of the swap transac-
tions. ,280 Hours after the court's pretrial ruling, BT agreed to forgive
most of P&G's loss. P&G was allowed to get away with about $20
million in losses. Clearly, BT's state-law exposure proved decisive.
The Modernization Act does nothing to mitigate such exposure.
274 See supra Part LB. 1.
275 Thomas, supra note 218, at A6.
276 id.
277 Id.
278 See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D. Ohio 1996).





Judge Easterbrook provides a solid basis for the proposition
that OTC interest rate swaps fall beyond the Act's main jurisdic-
tional boundary. OTC interest rate swaps would fall beyond the
Act's jurisdiction if "contract for future delivery" were interpreted
with reference to the institutional differences between forward and
futures transactions. Enactment of the Modernization Act was
critical, however, because it is not clear that either the CFTC or the
courts would have ultimately favored such an approach in dealing
with transactions involving financial "commodities." Quite possi-
bly, some variant of the traditional model would have been ap-
plied. Under the traditional model, the Act's jurisdictional fog,
like an angel of death, would have enveloped the OTC derivative
markets, suffocating all who would make use of them. Market
participants, sensing that the Act's jurisdictional ambiguity might
be resolved against them, became increasingly skittish in recent
years. The Modernization Act, by clearly excluding OTC interest
rate swaps involving eligible participants from the Act's jurisdic-
tion, should allay such fears.
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